A Heterogeneous Electorate
Political sophistication, predisposition strength,
and the voting decision process

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Table B1: Vote of routine nonmanual and service class employees in Germany, by sector of employment, 1976–2002

Routine nonmanual employees

	CDU/CSU		SPD		*N*	
	Private	Public	Private	Public	Private	Public
1976	32.7	44.0	55.8	52.0	52	25
1983	36.5	33.3	45.9	38.9	74	18
1990	42.4	54.1	44.6	35.1	92	37
1994	30.3	12.5	60.6	37.5	33	8
1998	25.8	23.1	68.2	61.5	66	13
2002	32.8	33.3	52.5	58.3	61	12

Service class

	CDU/CSU		SPD		*N*	
	Private	Public	Private	Public	Private	Public
1976	38.9	35.7	46.3	51.0	95	98
1983	45.5	27.6	43.2	51.7	88	58
1990	53.8	37.5	31.9	42.4	119	144
1994	32.4	31.6	36.5	42.1	74	57
1998	31.9	29.5	48.3	39.6	263	139
2002	50.6	41.2	31.3	41.2	259	119

Note: the shares of vote and the number of cases are based on all voters, not only on the supporters of the SPD and CDU/CSU.

Table B2: Voting behaviour of the new middle class in Switzerland, by employment sector, 1995–2003

Routine nonmanual employees

	Left		Center		Liberal Right		Conservative Right		N	
	Private	Public	Private	Public	Private	Public	Private	Public	Private	Public
1995	48.6	57.1	13.5	14.3	29.7	21.4	8.1	7.1	37	14
1999	25.0	52.9	21.2	11.8	23.1	11.8	30.8	23.5	52	17
2003	32.2	40.0	15.3	13.3	23.7	13.3	28.8	33.3	59	30

Administrative specialists

	Left		Center		Liberal Right		Conservative Right		N	
	Private	Public	Private	Public	Private	Public	Private	Public	Private	Public
1995	33.9	34.7	15.3	20.8	33.9	26.4	16.9	18.1	189	72
1999	23.9	43.8	16.6	15.0	31.2	20.0	28.3	21.3	205	80
2003	33.6	40.5	18.8	17.6	23.1	16.2	24.5	25.7	229	74

Technical specialists

	Left		Center		Liberal Right		Conservative Right		N	
	Private	Public	Private	Public	Private	Public	Private	Public	Private	Public
1995	31.3	29.3	17.9	19.5	28.4	31.7	22.4	19.5	134	41
1999	41.1	50.0	15.2	23.3	25.9	16.7	17.7	10.0	158	30
2003	38.5	55.6	15.5	15.6	26.1	6.7	19.9	22.2	161	45

Social-cultural specialists

	Left		Center		Liberal Right		Conservative Right		N	
	Private	Public	Private	Public	Private	Public	Private	Public	Private	Public
1995	52.1	60.4	15.5	11.5	26.8	20.8	5.6	7.3	71	96
1999	69.4	61.5	6.9	15.4	16.7	12.5	6.9	10.6	72	104
2003	50.7	60.6	19.2	16.8	19.2	11.0	11.0	11.7	73	137

Table B3: Effect of social-structural characteristics on voting choices in Germany, 1969–2002

	1969	1972	1976	1980	1983
Unskilled worker	–0.31	–0.56[a]	–0.14	–0.14	0.05
	(0.37)	(0.32)	(0.35)	(0.45)	(0.37)
Skilled worker	–0.58[a]	–0.76[b]	0.44	–0.03	0.10
	(0.34)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.41)	(0.34)
Routine nonmanual	–0.51	–0.42	0.54	0.16	0.15
	(0.44)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.42)	(0.37)
Service class	0.00	0.21	0.81[c]	0.23	0.53
	(0.36)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.39)	(0.33)
Self-employed	1.29[c]	0.56	1.55[d]	1.26[c]	1.39[d]
	(0.45)	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.49)	(0.41)
Farmer	1.38[b]	1.09[b]	1.78[c]	2.14[c]	1.86[c]
	(0.64)	(0.49)	(0.62)	(0.76)	(0.70)
Protestant, low attendance	–0.25	0.24	0.23	0.30	0.40
	(0.74)	(0.38)	(0.30)	(0.43)	(0.32)
Protestant, high attendance	0.21	0.95[a]	0.60	1.11[a]	0.36
	(0.78)	(0.56)	(0.49)	(0.62)	(0.44)
Catholic, low attendance	0.04	0.84[b]	0.94[c]	1.03[b]	0.56[a]
	(0.76)	(0.39)	(0.31)	(0.44)	(0.33)
Catholic, high attendance	1.26[a]	2.57[d]	2.66[d]	2.56[d]	1.75[d]
	(0.74)	(0.41)	(0.35)	(0.48)	(0.38)
Retired	0.50	–0.26	–0.19	–0.35	0.03
	(0.36)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.30)	(0.23)
Education	0.77	1.07[c]	0.89[b]	0.44	–0.07
	(0.51)	(0.38)	(0.37)	(0.45)	(0.39)
Age	0.00	0.02[c]	0.02[c]	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gender	0.39[a]	–0.26	0.03	–0.48[b]	–0.32[a]
	(0.22)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.20)	(0.16)
Union member	–0.85[c]	–0.59[c]	–0.86[d]	–0.48[a]	–0.51[b]
	(0.30)	(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.25)	(0.20)
Constant	–0.54	–1.14[b]	–1.46[d]	–1.16[b]	–0.66
	(0.82)	(0.47)	(0.42)	(0.55)	(0.47)
N	602	993	960	684	851
Log Likelihood	–353.5	–538.9	–547.5	–388.3	–538.8
McFadden R^2	0.15	0.19	0.18	0.17	0.09

a: $p<0.1$; b: $p<0.05$; c: $p<0.01$; d: $p<0.001$.

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Table B3 *(continued)*

	1987	1990	1994	1998	2002
Unskilled worker	0.84[b]	0.77	0.20	–0.02	0.00
	(0.39)	(0.52)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.49)
Skilled worker	0.15	0.37	–0.64[a]	–0.40	0.13
	(0.34)	(0.45)	(0.34)	(0.36)	(0.47)
Routine nonmanual	0.64[a]	0.86[a]	–0.04	–0.92[b]	–0.58
	(0.37)	(0.46)	(0.35)	(0.40)	(0.49)
Service class	0.73[b]	0.85[a]	0.20	–0.28	0.24
	(0.34)	(0.43)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.42)
Self-employed	1.22[c]	1.70[d]	1.01[b]	0.83[a]	0.92[a]
	(0.39)	(0.51)	(0.48)	(0.42)	(0.50)
Farmer	1.10[a]	34.59	0.75	33.02	0.96
	(0.61)	(.)	(0.90)	(.)	(1.19)
Protestant, low attendance	0.38	–0.26	0.02	–0.33	0.16
	(0.31)	(0.35)	(0.33)	(0.27)	(0.27)
Protestant, high attendance	1.11[b]	0.65	0.52	0.56	0.56
	(0.53)	(0.56)	(0.50)	(0.38)	(0.42)
Catholic, low attendance	0.66[b]	0.32	0.64[a]	0.13	0.68[b]
	(0.31)	(0.36)	(0.33)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Catholic, high attendance	1.95[d]	1.37[c]	1.82[d]	1.33[d]	2.12[d]
	(0.35)	(0.40)	(0.48)	(0.32)	(0.38)
Retired	–0.21	0.47[a]	–0.09	–0.48[a]	0.04
	(0.22)	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.27)	(0.28)
Education	1.01[c]	–0.18	–0.06	0.52	0.35
	(0.37)	(0.36)	(0.38)	(0.37)	(0.39)
Age	0.01[b]	0.00	0.01[a]	0.03[d]	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gender	–0.14	–0.49[c]	–0.67[c]	–0.08	–0.25
	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Union member	–0.88[d]	–0.80[d]	–0.88[d]	–1.02[d]	–0.88[d]
	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.31)	(0.24)
Constant	–1.25[c]	–0.54	–0.02	–0.25	–0.42
	(0.45)	(0.54)	(0.46)	(0.43)	(0.53)
N	1011	681	566	701	655
Log Likelihood	–624.7	–412.8	–347.3	–412.3	–403.0
McFadden R^2	0.11	0.12	0.11	0.14	0.10

a: $p<0.1$; b: $p<0.05$; c: $p<0.01$; d: $p<0.001$.

Note: Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) estimated by logit regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy taking the value 1 for CDU voters and the value 0 for SPD voters.

Table B4: Effect of social-structural characteristics on voting choices in Switzerland, model 1, 1971–2003

| | 1971 | | | 1975 | | | 1979 | | |
	Center	Lib. Right	Con. Right	Center	Lib. Right	Con. Right	Center	Lib. Right	Con. Right
Worker	−0.65[a]	−0.57	−1.60[d]	−1.36[d]	−1.08[b]	−0.19	−0.33	−0.10	−0.11
	(0.37)	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.41)	(0.44)	(0.57)	(0.50)	(0.46)	(0.67)
Routine nonmanual	−0.14	−0.01	−1.24[b]	−1.14[b]	−1.12[b]	−0.86	0.19	−0.08	−0.30
	(0.40)	(0.45)	(0.48)	(0.45)	(0.49)	(0.68)	(0.55)	(0.52)	(0.76)
Service class	0.69[a]	0.76[a]	−0.61	−0.47	−0.02	−0.07	0.62	0.57	0.18
	(0.40)	(0.44)	(0.46)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.58)	(0.40)	(0.38)	(0.57)
Self-employed	0.79	1.41[c]	0.74	−0.52	0.50	1.36[a]	2.62[c]	2.68[c]	2.57[c]
	(0.50)	(0.52)	(0.52)	(0.69)	(0.67)	(0.79)	(0.85)	(0.83)	(0.96)
Farmer	1.40[b]	0.95	1.69[b]	21.9[d]	21.8	24.1[d]	0.48	−0.12	2.26[b]
	(0.65)	(0.74)	(0.67)	(0.67)	(.)	(0.74)	(1.16)	(1.30)	(1.05)
Protestant	1.10[b]	1.24[b]	0.88	−0.05	1.04[a]	1.57	0.28	0.20	0.85
	(0.55)	(0.53)	(0.54)	(0.54)	(0.63)	(1.08)	(0.65)	(0.52)	(0.84)
Catholic	2.60[d]	1.43[c]	−0.09	1.03[a]	0.88	0.41	2.52[d]	0.88	−0.15
	(0.56)	(0.55)	(0.57)	(0.54)	(0.64)	(1.11)	(0.66)	(0.55)	(0.93)
Retired	−0.31	0.16	0.33	0.84[a]	0.13	1.42[b]	−0.55	−0.18	−1.15[a]
	(0.36)	(0.37)	(0.44)	(0.46)	(0.52)	(0.57)	(0.46)	(0.45)	(0.63)
Education	0.46	0.91[c]	−0.42	0.41	0.83[b]	−0.10	1.12[c]	1.00[c]	−0.11
	(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.35)	(0.33)	(0.36)	(0.47)	(0.40)	(0.37)	(0.50)
Age	−0.01	−0.01	−0.03[d]	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.03[b]	0.01	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gender	0.16	0.31	0.21	−0.32	0.13	0.43	0.72[b]	0.55	0.31
	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.27)	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.42)	(0.36)	(0.34)	(0.51)
Constant	−1.50[b]	−1.94[c]	−0.26	0.05	−1.32[a]	−2.61[b]	−2.28[c]	−1.37[b]	−1.74[a]
	(0.66)	(0.67)	(0.67)	(0.67)	(0.77)	(1.21)	(0.79)	(0.67)	(1.02)
N		952			584			514	
Log Likelihood		−1105.7			−688.2			−591.1	
McFadden R^2		0.13			0.11			0.13	

a: p<0.1; b: p<0.05; c: p<0.01; d: p<0.001.

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Table B4 (*continued*)

	1987			1991			1995		
	Center	Lib. Right	Con. Right	Center	Lib. Right	Con. Right	Center	Lib. Right	Con. Right
Worker	−0.53	0.05	−0.10	−0.33	−0.94	−0.12	−0.41	−0.51	0.39
	(0.61)	(0.60)	(0.68)	(0.53)	(0.62)	(0.54)	(0.37)	(0.33)	(0.33)
Routine nonmanual	−0.97	−1.00	−34.3	0.09	0.00	−0.88	−0.12	0.18	0.10
	(0.82)	(0.87)	(.)	(0.52)	(0.56)	(0.66)	(0.43)	(0.36)	(0.40)
Service class	0.06	0.23	0.13	−0.42	0.14	−0.26	−0.16	0.14	−0.06
	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.47)	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.44)	(0.32)	(0.28)	(0.31)
Self-employed	0.05	0.59	0.01	0.09	0.90[a]	0.80	0.51	0.64	0.87[a]
	(0.55)	(0.53)	(0.63)	(0.53)	(0.53)	(0.55)	(0.49)	(0.43)	(0.45)
Farmer	22.9[d]	22.3	23.4[d]	1.55	1.22	2.89[b]	1.43[a]	0.97	1.85[b]
	(0.73)	(.)	(0.76)	(1.16)	(1.22)	(1.12)	(0.84)	(0.78)	(0.72)
Protestant	−0.30	0.74	0.55	1.57[b]	0.60	1.20[a]	−0.55[a]	0.49[a]	0.16
	(0.52)	(0.51)	(0.51)	(0.78)	(0.52)	(0.60)	(0.31)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Catholic	1.69[c]	1.29[b]	−0.33	2.89[d]	1.14[b]	0.38	1.14[d]	0.71[c]	0.06
	(0.50)	(0.53)	(0.58)	(0.78)	(0.53)	(0.64)	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.27)
Retired	−1.95[c]	−1.10[a]	−1.80[b]	−1.17[b]	−0.38	−0.23	0.22	0.11	−0.35
	(0.62)	(0.61)	(0.70)	(0.59)	(0.62)	(0.64)	(0.36)	(0.30)	(0.32)
Education	0.60	0.61	−0.55	0.39	−0.58	−1.44[c]	−0.10	−0.27	−0.76[c]
	(0.45)	(0.43)	(0.49)	(0.48)	(0.49)	(0.53)	(0.31)	(0.27)	(0.29)
Age	0.05[d]	0.04[c]	0.04[b]	0.04[d]	0.02	0.01	0.02[a]	0.02[c]	0.03[d]
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gender	−0.02	0.10	0.03	−0.12	−0.61[a]	0.07	−0.15	−0.23	−0.36[a]
	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.37)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.19)
Constant	−0.91	−1.54[b]	−0.41	−2.02[b]	−0.40	−0.57	−0.98[b]	−0.65	−0.11
	(0.68)	(0.70)	(0.72)	(0.90)	(0.71)	(0.76)	(0.46)	(0.40)	(0.42)
N		437			462			1043	
Log Likelihood		−514.0			−571.1			−1313.3	
McFadden R^2		0.13			0.10			0.06	

a: $p<0.1$; b: $p<0.05$; c: $p<0.01$; d: $p<0.001$.

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Table B4 (*continued*)

	1999 Center	1999 Lib. Right	1999 Con. Right	2003 Center	2003 Lib. Right	2003 Con. Right
Worker	0.38	–0.08	0.44	–0.82[b]	–0.23	0.30
	(0.39)	(0.34)	(0.31)	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.30)
Routine nonmanual	0.95[b]	0.57	0.31	–0.59	–0.25	–0.11
	(0.42)	(0.36)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.33)
Service class	0.38	–0.05	–0.05	–0.74[b]	–0.34	–0.36
	(0.35)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.27)
Self-employed	0.73	1.07[b]	1.44[c]	–0.46	0.08	0.73[a]
	(0.59)	(0.46)	(0.45)	(0.54)	(0.49)	(0.42)
Farmer	1.98[b]	2.11[b]	2.46[c]	–0.84	0.41	2.13[c]
	(0.91)	(0.82)	(0.80)	(1.27)	(1.04)	(0.79)
Protestant	–0.03	0.34	0.18	0.03	0.68[c]	0.41[b]
	(0.34)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.29)	(0.22)	(0.19)
Catholic	1.31[d]	0.44[a]	0.02	1.79[d]	0.64[c]	0.38[a]
	(0.32)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.20)
Retired	0.44	0.13	0.17	0.14	0.31	–0.05
	(0.33)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.25)
Education	–0.89[c]	0.26	–1.39[d]	–0.37	0.61[b]	–1.02[d]
	(0.32)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.24)
Age	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01[a]	0.02[b]	0.01[b]
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gender	–0.12	–0.17	–0.50[c]	–0.20	–0.14	–0.35[b]
	(0.21)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.16)
Constant	–1.35[c]	–1.00[b]	0.47	–0.82[b]	–1.52[d]	0.27
	(0.50)	(0.42)	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.33)
N	1124			1217		
Log Likelihood	–1413.6			–1485.6		
McFadden R^2	0.07			0.08		

a: $p<0.1$; b: $p<0.05$; c: $p<0.01$; d: $p<0.001$.

Note: Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) estimated by multinomial logistic regressions. The base outcome includes respondents who voted for a Left party.

Table B5: Effect of social-structural characteristics on voting choices in Switzerland, model 2, 1971–2003

	1971			1975		
	Center	L. Right	C. Right	Center	L. Right	C. Right
Unskilled worker	–0.52	0.73	0.29	–0.54	0.60	1.42
	(0.64)	(0.78)	(0.89)	(0.67)	(0.92)	(1.20)
Skillled worker	–0.90	–0.19	–0.27	–0.60	0.51	0.02
	(0.61)	(0.76)	(0.86)	(0.64)	(0.89)	(1.21)
Routine nonmanual	–0.45	0.87	0.15	–0.86	–0.03	0.42
	(0.68)	(0.80)	(0.93)	(0.70)	(0.96)	(1.26)
Service class	0.62	1.41[a]	0.80	0.01	1.59[a]	1.11
	(0.61)	(0.74)	(0.85)	(0.63)	(0.87)	(1.18)
Self-employed	0.87	2.07[c]	1.74[b]	0.51	2.40[b]	2.11
	(0.65)	(0.77)	(0.88)	(0.81)	(1.00)	(1.32)
Farmer	0.87	1.76[a]	3.05[c]	1.86[a]	2.89[b]	4.41[c]
	(0.78)	(0.91)	(0.96)	(0.96)	(1.17)	(1.37)
Protestant, low attendance	0.70	1.10[b]	0.80	–0.28	1.16[a]	0.41
	(0.48)	(0.49)	(0.53)	(0.50)	(0.62)	(0.71)
Protestant, high attendance	0.77	0.57	0.83	0.54	1.31[a]	1.43[a]
	(0.57)	(0.59)	(0.61)	(0.56)	(0.69)	(0.76)
Catholic, low attendance	1.20[b]	0.98[a]	–0.11	0.05	0.90	–1.57
	(0.51)	(0.53)	(0.59)	(0.53)	(0.66)	(1.00)
Catholic, high attendance	3.12[d]	1.44[b]	–0.11	1.50[c]	1.16[a]	–0.13
	(0.52)	(0.56)	(0.65)	(0.51)	(0.66)	(0.78)
Retired	–0.08	0.36	0.31	0.70	–0.11	1.21[b]
	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.44)	(0.46)	(0.52)	(0.58)
Education	0.50[a]	1.09[d]	–0.29	0.52	0.77[b]	–0.05
	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.50)
Age	–0.02[b]	–0.01	–0.03[c]	0.00	0.01	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gender	–0.02	0.16	0.12	–0.03	0.34	0.08
	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.34)
Constant	–1.07	–2.52[c]	–1.57	–0.48	–2.94[c]	–2.63[a]
	(0.76)	(0.89)	(0.99)	(0.78)	(1.07)	(1.35)
N	959			583		
Log Likelihood	–1076.5			–666.1		
McFadden R^2	0.16			0.14		

a: $p<0.1$; b: $p<0.05$; c: $p<0.01$; d: $p<0.001$.

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Table B5 (*continued*)

	1979			1995		
	Center	L. Right	C. Right	Center	L. Right	C. Right
Unskilled worker	–1.19	–0.28	0.51	0.27	–0.03	0.30
	(0.90)	(0.84)	(1.36)	(0.52)	(0.46)	(0.41)
Skillled worker	–0.18	–0.24	0.90	0.08	0.11	0.01
	(0.62)	(0.65)	(1.15)	(0.50)	(0.42)	(0.40)
Routine nonmanual	–0.11	0.25	0.38	–0.17	0.20	–1.47^b
	(0.68)	(0.67)	(1.25)	(0.60)	(0.47)	(0.63)
Service class	0.08	0.76	0.92	0.43	0.59^a	–0.36
	(0.55)	(0.57)	(1.11)	(0.42)	(0.35)	(0.35)
Self-employed	1.29^b	1.78^c	2.39^b	1.14^b	0.79^a	0.45
	(0.65)	(0.66)	(1.17)	(0.54)	(0.47)	(0.45)
Farmer	0.85	–0.08	3.79^c	2.64^c	1.77^b	1.82^b
	(1.08)	(1.35)	(1.34)	(0.80)	(0.78)	(0.73)
Protestant, low attendance	0.06	0.47	0.70	–0.85^b	0.49^a	0.16
	(0.56)	(0.48)	(0.72)	(0.34)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Protestant, high attendance	1.78^b	0.73	0.28	0.15	0.65^a	0.11
	(0.80)	(0.80)	(1.20)	(0.44)	(0.36)	(0.39)
Catholic, low attendance	1.08^a	0.75	–0.70	0.26	0.71^b	0.05
	(0.59)	(0.53)	(0.92)	(0.32)	(0.28)	(0.29)
Catholic, high attendance	4.12^d	2.25^c	0.98	1.88^d	0.73^b	0.07
	(0.72)	(0.69)	(1.03)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.33)
Retired	–0.43	–0.12	–1.24^a	0.37	0.09	–0.40
	(0.48)	(0.44)	(0.64)	(0.36)	(0.29)	(0.31)
Education	0.92^b	0.73^a	–0.21	–0.14	–0.33	–0.80^c
	(0.43)	(0.38)	(0.54)	(0.32)	(0.27)	(0.28)
Age	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.02^c	0.03^d
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gender	0.13	0.02	–0.10	–0.33	–0.21	–0.41^b
	(0.29)	(0.26)	(0.36)	(0.21)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Constant	–1.68^b	–1.58^b	–2.35^a	–1.40^c	–1.02^b	0.27
	(0.84)	(0.79)	(1.35)	(0.54)	(0.47)	(0.46)
N	519			1051		
Log Likelihood	–561.0			–1286.1		
McFadden R^2	0.18			0.09		

a: p<0.1; b: p<0.05; c: p<0.01; d: p<0.001.

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Table B5 (*continued*)

	1999			2003		
	Center	L. Right	C. Right	Center	L. Right	C. Right
Unskilled worker	0.63	–0.23	0.61	–0.99[a]	–0.37	0.00
	(0.55)	(0.48)	(0.42)	(0.53)	(0.47)	(0.39)
Skillled worker	0.64	–0.09	0.04	–0.42	–0.64	–0.19
	(0.49)	(0.42)	(0.40)	(0.47)	(0.45)	(0.38)
Routine nonmanual	0.61	–0.08	0.22	–0.48	–0.15	–0.25
	(0.56)	(0.48)	(0.46)	(0.52)	(0.45)	(0.41)
Service class	0.39	–0.30	–0.42	–0.27	–0.43	–0.67[b]
	(0.44)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.40)	(0.36)	(0.33)
Self-employed	1.45[b]	1.42[c]	1.35[c]	–0.13	0.30	0.68
	(0.64)	(0.52)	(0.52)	(0.59)	(0.50)	(0.44)
Farmer	2.66[b]	2.54[b]	3.13[c]	–1.02	–0.31	1.66[c]
	(1.19)	(1.11)	(1.08)	(0.98)	(0.94)	(0.63)
Protestant, low attendance	–0.41	0.23	0.05	–0.34	0.71[c]	0.41[b]
	(0.37)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.33)	(0.23)	(0.20)
Protestant, high attendance	1.04[b]	0.20	0.48	1.14[c]	0.73[b]	0.29
	(0.43)	(0.37)	(0.34)	(0.37)	(0.34)	(0.32)
Catholic, low attendance	0.81[b]	0.28	0.01	1.05[d]	0.55[b]	0.23
	(0.34)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.22)
Catholic, high attendance	2.23[d]	0.53	0.09	3.01[d]	0.92[b]	0.75[b]
	(0.38)	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.33)	(0.37)	(0.32)
Retired	0.24	0.14	0.07	0.13	0.29	–0.10
	(0.33)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.27)	(0.25)
Education	–0.63[a]	0.34	–1.18[d]	–0.46	0.55[a]	–0.99[d]
	(0.33)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.24)
Age	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01[b]	0.01[b]
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gender	–0.04	–0.11	–0.53[c]	–0.23	–0.20	–0.46[c]
	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.16)
Constant	–1.60[c]	–0.79[a]	0.66	–1.00[b]	–1.33[c]	0.58
	(0.57)	(0.47)	(0.45)	(0.49)	(0.45)	(0.39)
N	1134			1222		
Log Likelihood	–1390.2			–1449.3		
McFadden R^2	0.09			0.11		

a: $p<0.1$; b: $p<0.05$; c: $p<0.01$; d: $p<0.001$.

Note: Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) estimated by multinomial logistic regressions. The base outcome includes respondents who voted for a Left party.

Table B6: Effect of social-structural characteristics on voting choices in Switzerland, model 3, 1971–2003

	1971			1975		
	Center	L. Right	C. Right	Center	L. Right	C. Right
Unskilled worker	–0.53	0.72	0.29	–0.04	1.00	1.99
	(0.65)	(0.78)	(0.89)	(0.70)	(0.94)	(1.22)
Skillled worker	–0.80	–0.14	–0.19	–0.21	0.83	0.50
	(0.62)	(0.76)	(0.87)	(0.66)	(0.90)	(1.23)
Routine nonmanual	–0.40	0.88	0.19	–0.62	0.17	0.77
	(0.69)	(0.80)	(0.93)	(0.71)	(0.97)	(1.27)
Service class	0.71	1.47^b	0.88	0.25	1.78^b	1.35
	(0.62)	(0.74)	(0.86)	(0.65)	(0.88)	(1.19)
Self-employed	0.94	2.12^c	1.81^b	0.59	2.45^b	2.21^a
	(0.65)	(0.77)	(0.88)	(0.83)	(1.00)	(1.33)
Farmer	0.64	1.58^a	2.83^c	2.00^b	2.99^b	4.54^c
	(0.79)	(0.92)	(0.96)	(0.98)	(1.17)	(1.38)
Protestant, low attendance	0.73	1.11^b	0.81	–0.35	1.11^a	0.31
	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.53)	(0.52)	(0.64)	(0.73)
Protestant, high attendance	0.83	0.62	0.88	0.60	1.36^a	1.49^a
	(0.57)	(0.59)	(0.61)	(0.58)	(0.70)	(0.78)
Catholic, low attendance	1.27^b	1.03^a	–0.06	–0.03	0.84	–1.63
	(0.51)	(0.53)	(0.59)	(0.54)	(0.67)	(1.01)
Catholic, high attendance	3.22^d	1.52^c	–0.03	1.57^c	1.22^a	–0.06
	(0.53)	(0.56)	(0.65)	(0.52)	(0.67)	(0.8)
Retired	–0.12	0.33	0.29	0.56	–0.23	1.04^a
	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.44)	(0.47)	(0.53)	(0.59)
Education	0.45	1.04^d	–0.35	0.66^a	0.86^b	0.12
	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.38)	(0.51)
Age	–0.01^a	–0.01	–0.02^c	0.00	0.01	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gender	–0.10	0.10	0.05	–0.25	0.15	–0.18
	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.35)
Trade-union member	–0.72^d	–0.53^b	–0.70^c	–1.02^d	–0.84^c	–1.33^d
	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.37)
Constant	–0.77	–2.28^b	–1.27	–0.28	–2.74^b	–2.36^a
	(0.77)	(0.90)	(0.99)	(0.80)	(1.08)	(1.36)
N		959			583	
Log Likelihood		–1069.0			–654.0	
McFadden R^2		0.17			0.15	

a: p<0.1; b: p<0.05; c: p<0.01; d: p<0.001.

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Table B6 (*continued*)

	1995			1999		
	Center	L. Right	C. Right	Center	L. Right	C. Right
Unskilled worker	0.31	0.07	0.38	0.74	–0.13	0.70
	(0.52)	(0.46)	(0.41)	(0.55)	(0.49)	(0.43)
Skillled worker	0.14	0.25	0.11	0.78	0.04	0.16
	(0.50)	(0.43)	(0.40)	(0.49)	(0.42)	(0.41)
Routine nonmanual	–0.14	0.30	–1.40[b]	0.63	–0.09	0.23
	(0.60)	(0.48)	(0.63)	(0.56)	(0.48)	(0.46)
Service class	0.47	0.70[a]	–0.28	0.42	–0.27	–0.39
	(0.42)	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.44)	(0.36)	(0.36)
Self-employed	1.13[b]	0.78[a]	0.44	1.39[b]	1.33[b]	1.30[b]
	(0.54)	(0.47)	(0.46)	(0.64)	(0.52)	(0.52)
Farmer	2.65[c]	1.77[b]	1.83[b]	2.60[b]	2.46[b]	3.08[c]
	(0.81)	(0.78)	(0.73)	(1.20)	(1.11)	(1.08)
Protestant, low attendance	–0.85[b]	0.49[a]	0.17	–0.38	0.27	0.07
	(0.34)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.37)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Protestant, high attendance	0.14	0.63[a]	0.09	1.14[c]	0.31	0.57
	(0.45)	(0.36)	(0.39)	(0.43)	(0.37)	(0.35)
Catholic, low attendance	0.26	0.70[b]	0.05	0.84[b]	0.31	0.03
	(0.32)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.34)	(0.27)	(0.27)
Catholic, high attendance	1.89[d]	0.75[b]	0.08	2.32[d]	0.64[a]	0.17
	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.34)	(0.38)	(0.35)	(0.35)
Retired	0.31	–0.02	–0.49	0.12	0.00	–0.04
	(0.36)	(0.30)	(0.32)	(0.34)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Education	–0.14	–0.34	–0.80[c]	–0.58[a]	0.40	–1.13[d]
	(0.32)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.33)	(0.30)	(0.28)
Age	0.01	0.02[c]	0.03[d]	0.00	0.01	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gender	–0.35[a]	–0.26	–0.44[b]	–0.09	–0.16	–0.58[d]
	(0.21)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Trade-union member	–0.27	–0.64[c]	–0.45[b]	–0.84[d]	–0.97[d]	–0.71[d]
	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.25)	(0.21)	(0.20)
Constant	–1.35[b]	–0.90[a]	0.36	–1.47[b]	–0.63	0.78[a]
	(0.55)	(0.47)	(0.46)	(0.58)	(0.47)	(0.45)
N		1051			1134	
Log Likelihood		–1280.2			–1375.1	
McFadden R^2		0.09			0.10	

a: $p<0.1$; b: $p<0.05$; c: $p<0.01$; d: $p<0.001$.

(*Continued on next page*)

Table B6 (*continued*)

| | 2003 | | |
	Center	L. Right	C. Right
Unskilled worker	–0.93[a]	–0.31	0.06
	(0.53)	(0.47)	(0.39)
Skillled worker	–0.38	–0.59	–0.14
	(0.47)	(0.45)	(0.38)
Routine nonmanual	–0.43	–0.07	–0.19
	(0.52)	(0.45)	(0.41)
Service class	–0.25	–0.41	–0.65[b]
	(0.4)	(0.36)	(0.33)
Self-employed	–0.16	0.26	0.64
	(0.59)	(0.5)	(0.44)
Farmer	–0.95	–0.22	1.73[c]
	(0.98)	(0.94)	(0.64)
Protestant, low attendance	–0.35	0.69[c]	0.39[b]
	(0.33)	(0.23)	(0.2)
Protestant, high attendance	1.12[c]	0.70[b]	0.26
	(0.37)	(0.34)	(0.32)
Catholic, low attendance	1.04[d]	0.52[b]	0.21
	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.22)
Catholic, high attendance	3.01[d]	0.92[b]	0.75[b]
	(0.33)	(0.37)	(0.32)
Retired	0.12	0.27	–0.12
	(0.31)	(0.27)	(0.25)
Education	–0.44	0.58[b]	–0.96[d]
	(0.3)	(0.29)	(0.24)
Age	0	0.01[a]	0.01[b]
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gender	–0.23	–0.19	–0.46[c]
	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.16)
Trade-union member	–0.54[a]	–0.85[c]	–0.66[c]
	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.23)
Constant	–0.96[b]	–1.26[c]	0.64[a]
	(0.49)	(0.45)	(0.39)
N		1222	
Log Likelihood		–1441.9	
McFadden R^2		0.11	

a: $p<0.1$; b: $p<0.05$; c: $p<0.01$; d: $p<0.001$.

Note: Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) estimated by multinomial logistic regressions. The base outcome includes respondents who voted for a Left party.

Table B7: Effect of social-structural characteristics on voting choices in Switzerland, model 4, 1975–2003

	1975			1995		
	Center	L. Right	C. Right	Center	L. Right	C. Right
Unskilled worker	–0.02	1.03	1.99	0.35	0.10	0.41
	(0.70)	(0.94)	(1.22)	(0.52)	(0.46)	(0.41)
Skillled worker	–0.19	0.85	0.48	0.18	0.28	0.16
	(0.66)	(0.90)	(1.23)	(0.50)	(0.42)	(0.40)
Routine nonmanual	–0.61	0.17	0.74	–0.12	0.31	–1.38^b
	(0.71)	(0.97)	(1.27)	(0.60)	(0.47)	(0.63)
Administrative specialist	0.62	2.40^c	2.03^a	0.58	0.89^b	–0.08
	(0.69)	(0.91)	(1.21)	(0.44)	(0.37)	(0.37)
Technical expert	0.15	1.37	0.25	1.00^b	0.99^b	0.30
	(0.70)	(0.92)	(1.32)	(0.47)	(0.40)	(0.40)
Social-cultural specialist	–0.19	0.90	1.05	–0.15	0.17	–1.43^c
	(0.73)	(0.96)	(1.30)	(0.48)	(0.40)	(0.46)
Self-employed	0.62	2.49^b	2.21^a	1.17^b	0.79^a	0.46
	(0.83)	(1.00)	(1.33)	(0.54)	(0.47)	(0.45)
Farmer	2.02^b	3.02^c	4.53^c	2.68^d	1.79^b	1.85^b
	(0.98)	(1.17)	(1.38)	(0.81)	(0.78)	(0.73)
Protestant, low attendance	–0.43	0.89	0.13	–0.88^b	0.46^a	0.12
	(0.52)	(0.64)	(0.74)	(0.34)	(0.26)	(0.26)
Protestant, high attendance	0.53	1.18^a	1.30	0.13	0.63^a	0.08
	(0.58)	(0.70)	(0.79)	(0.45)	(0.37)	(0.39)
Catholic, low attendance	–0.12	0.61	–1.84^a	0.21	0.66^b	–0.01
	(0.55)	(0.68)	(1.02)	(0.33)	(0.28)	(0.29)
Catholic, high attendance	1.49^c	1.01	–0.25	1.90^d	0.74^b	0.08
	(0.53)	(0.68)	(0.81)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.34)
Retired	0.58	–0.19	1.04^a	0.35	–0.02	–0.45
	(0.48)	(0.54)	(0.60)	(0.37)	(0.30)	(0.32)
Education	0.73^b	1.01^c	0.21	–0.01	–0.20	–0.63^b
	(0.37)	(0.38)	(0.52)	(0.32)	(0.28)	(0.29)
Age	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.02^c	0.03^d
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gender	–0.20	0.25	–0.14	–0.29	–0.22	–0.37^b
	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.36)	(0.21)	(0.17)	(0.19)
Trade-union member	–1.02^d	–0.84^c	–1.36^d	–0.25	–0.63^c	–0.43^b
	(0.25)	(0.27)	(0.37)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.21)
Constant	–0.27	–2.66^b	–2.20	–1.48^c	–1.00^b	0.22
	(0.81)	(1.08)	(1.36)	(0.55)	(0.47)	(0.46)
N		583			1051	
Log Likelihood		–646.4			–1264.2	
McFadden R^2		0.16			0.10	

a: $p<0.1$; b: $p<0.05$; c: $p<0.01$; d: $p<0.001$.

(*Continued on next page*)

Table B7 (*continued*)

	1999			2003		
	Center	L. Right	C. Right	Center	L. Right	C. Right
Unskilled worker	0.76	–0.10	0.72[a]	–0.93[a]	–0.30	0.06
	(0.55)	(0.49)	(0.43)	(0.53)	(0.47)	(0.39)
Skillled worker	0.80	0.07	0.17	–0.37	–0.57	–0.13
	(0.49)	(0.42)	(0.40)	(0.47)	(0.45)	(0.38)
Routine nonmanual	0.60	–0.12	0.20	–0.43	–0.07	–0.19
	(0.56)	(0.48)	(0.46)	(0.52)	(0.45)	(0.41)
Administrative specialist	0.81[a]	0.24	0.21	–0.03	–0.13	–0.27
	(0.47)	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.42)	(0.38)	(0.35)
Technical expert	0.43	–0.33	–0.67	–0.20	–0.28	–0.62[a]
	(0.49)	(0.40)	(0.41)	(0.45)	(0.39)	(0.37)
Social-cultural specialist	–0.26	–1.22[c]	–1.47[d]	–0.59	–0.98[b]	–1.36[d]
	(0.50)	(0.42)	(0.44)	(0.44)	(0.40)	(0.39)
Self-employed	1.38[b]	1.32[b]	1.26[b]	–0.15	0.26	0.64
	(0.64)	(0.52)	(0.52)	(0.59)	(0.50)	(0.44)
Farmer	2.65[b]	2.50[b]	3.10[c]	–0.96	–0.23	1.71[c]
	(1.20)	(1.12)	(1.08)	(0.98)	(0.94)	(0.63)
Protestant, low attendance	–0.41	0.22	0.00	–0.37	0.66[c]	0.36[a]
	(0.38)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.33)	(0.23)	(0.20)
Protestant, high attendance	1.26[c]	0.46	0.72[b]	1.17[c]	0.76[b]	0.32
	(0.44)	(0.38)	(0.36)	(0.38)	(0.34)	(0.32)
Catholic, low attendance	0.81[b]	0.27	–0.03	1.03[d]	0.50[b]	0.19
	(0.35)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.22)
Catholic, high attendance	2.35[d]	0.67[a]	0.19	3.03[d]	0.95[b]	0.76[b]
	(0.38)	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.33)	(0.37)	(0.32)
Retired	0.11	–0.02	–0.06	0.09	0.23	–0.17
	(0.34)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.27)	(0.25)
Education	–0.33	0.71[b]	–0.83[c]	–0.38	0.66[b]	–0.88[d]
	(0.34)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.25)
Age	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01[a]	0.01[b]
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gender	0.01	–0.06	–0.49[c]	–0.18	–0.13	–0.40[b]
	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.16)
Trade-union member	–0.78[c]	–0.89[d]	–0.64[c]	–0.52[a]	–0.82[c]	–0.63[c]
	(0.25)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.24)
Constant	–1.67[c]	–0.86[a]	0.60	–1.01[b]	–1.34[c]	0.58
	(0.58)	(0.48)	(0.46)	(0.49)	(0.46)	(0.39)
N		1134			1222	
Log Likelihood		–1349.8			–1430.8	
McFadden R^2		0.12			0.12	

a: $p<0.1$; b: $p<0.05$; c: $p<0.01$; d: $p<0.001$.

Note: Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) estimated by multinomial logistic regressions. The base outcome includes respondents who voted for a Left party.

Figure B1: Strength of the class cleavage in Switzerland, 1971–2003

Figure B2: Strength of the religious cleavage in Switzerland, with and without controlling for structural change, 1971–2003

Figure B3: Strength of the class cleavage in Switzerland, with and without controlling for structural change, 1971–2003

Figure B4: Percentage of party identifiers in Germany voting for 'their' party, 1972–2002

Table B8: Effect of social-structural predispositions on voting choices in Germany, 1972

	SPD		FDP	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
Party identification CDU	−5.67[d]	0.69	−108.28	.
Party identification SPD	5.07[d]	0.52	1.96[c]	0.61
Party identification FDP	−2.66	3.11	5.96[d]	1.58
Unskilled worker	0.11	0.51	−0.82	0.96
Skilled worker	0.68	0.46	0.63	0.69
Routine nonmanual	1.20[a]	0.67	1.23	0.98
Service class	−0.10	0.47	0.82	0.64
Self-employed	−0.53	0.54	0.07	0.73
Farmer	0.14	0.70	1.92[b]	0.91
Unskilled worker × trade-union	2.74	1.93	3.03	2.28
Skilled worker × trade-union	0.08	0.55	0.21	0.72
Routine nonmanual × trade-union	−0.52	1.09	0.64	1.28
Service class × trade-union	−0.81	0.55	−0.97	0.62
Catholic, low attendance	−0.87	0.63	−0.94	0.78
Catholic, high attendance	−1.71[c]	0.64	−1.32	0.82
Protestant, low attendance	−0.04	0.61	0.29	0.75
Protestant, high attendance	−0.74	0.88	−2.61	1.85
Retired	−0.17	0.43	−1.04	0.66
Education	−1.36[b]	0.64	0.54	0.70
Age	−0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01
Gender	0.34	0.28	0.11	0.35
Constant	0.72	0.73	−0.84	0.96
N		1105		
Log Likelihood		−440.8		
McFadden R^2		0.58		

a: p<0.1; b: p<0.05; c: p<0.01; d: p<0.001.
Note: Coefficients and standard errors estimated by a multinomial logistic regression. The base outcome includes respondents who voted for the CDU/CSU.

Table B9: Effect of social-structural predispositions on voting choices in Germany, 1976

	SPD		FDP	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
Party identification CDU	−9.23[d]	1.41	−5.90[d]	1.39
Party identification SPD	9.31[d]	1.07	5.51[d]	1.21
Party identification FDP	1.91	1.84	9.44[d]	1.65
Unskilled worker	1.14[a]	0.69	1.78[a]	1.03
Skilled worker	0.40	0.57	0.76	0.90
Routine nonmanual	0.02	0.69	0.99	1.00
Service class	−0.04	0.61	1.31	0.85
Self-employed	−0.33	0.70	0.12	1.08
Farmer	0.13	0.96	0.80	1.50
Unskilled worker × trade-union	−0.27	1.00	−36.97	.
Skilled worker × trade-union	0.04	0.60	0.42	0.85
Routine nonmanual × trade-union	−3.10[c]	1.09	−1.71	1.27
Service class × trade-union	0.48	0.66	−0.41	0.77
Catholic, low attendance	−0.03	0.62	−1.05	0.69
Catholic, high attendance	−0.63	0.67	−2.03[b]	0.90
Protestant, low attendance	0.31	0.60	−0.78	0.65
Protestant, high attendance	−0.72	0.97	−1.21	1.09
Retired	0.45	0.49	0.58	0.65
Education	−0.37	0.79	1.14	0.88
Age	−0.02	0.01	−0.01	0.02
Gender	0.18	0.33	0.25	0.43
Constant	−0.74	0.81	−2.34[b]	1.08
N		1058		
Log Likelihood		−289.7		
McFadden R^2		0.70		

a: p<0.1; b: p<0.05; c: p<0.01; d: p<0.001.
Note: Coefficients and standard errors estimated by a multinomial logistic regression. The base outcome includes respondents who voted for the CDU/CSU.

Table B10: Effect of social-structural predispositions on voting choices in Germany, 1980

	SPD		FDP		Greens	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
Party identification CDU	–9.95[d]	1.46	–5.38[d]	0.84	–120.70	.
Party identification SPD	13.50[d]	3.06	10.00[c]	3.08	–104.31	.
Party identification FDP	–119.28	.	5.94[d]	1.34	–11.60	7.18
Unskilled worker	0.84	0.82	–0.41	0.96	2.96	2.13
Skilled worker	0.49	0.64	0.66	0.65	–0.25	1.56
Routine nonmanual	0.39	0.66	0.52	0.68	–38.33	.
Service class	–0.36	0.61	0.16	0.61	1.47	1.33
Self-employed	–0.65	0.81	0.84	0.71	–35.20	.
Farmer	–1.82[a]	1.06	–1.14	1.12	–0.35	2.19
Unskilled worker × trade-union	–2.05[a]	1.19	–0.25	1.24	–41.48	.
Skilled worker × trade-union	–1.07	0.66	–1.16	0.72	–35.16	.
Routine nonmanual × trade-union	0.34	1.28	–0.37	1.44	2.35	.
Service class × trade-union	0.10	0.89	0.66	0.82	2.80[a]	1.56
Catholic, low attendance	–0.09	0.69	–0.40	0.69	–1.27	1.31
Catholic, high attendance	–1.21	0.76	–1.51[b]	0.76	–4.03[b]	1.97
Protestant, low attendance	0.49	0.69	0.15	0.68	–0.47	1.24
Protestant, high attendance	–0.08	1.16	–1.41	1.19	–27.08	.
Retired	0.13	0.54	–0.68	0.54	–27.60	.
Education	0.30	0.81	1.17	0.77	4.07[b]	1.82
Age	0.00	0.01	0.02[a]	0.01	–0.29[c]	0.10
Gender	–0.32	0.36	–0.07	0.35	–1.12	0.94
Constant	0.51	0.85	–0.32	0.86	–7.44[c]	2.82
N			845			
Log Likelihood			–368.6			
McFadden R^2			0.60			

a: $p<0.1$; b: $p<0.05$; c: $p<0.01$; d: $p<0.001$.

Note: Coefficients and standard errors estimated by a multinomial logistic regression. The base outcome includes respondents who voted for the CDU/CSU.

Table B11: Effect of social-structural predispositions on voting choices in Germany, 1983

	SPD		FDP		Greens	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
Party identification CDU	–10.65[d]	1.44	–2.85[c]	0.92	–112.85	.
Party identification SPD	7.29[d]	0.87	4.23[d]	1.25	5.81[d]	1.16
Party identification FDP	64.01	.	73.65[d]	2.24	–56.26	.
Party identification Greens	–2.72	3.42	–120.19	.	8.50[d]	2.22
Unskilled worker	–1.10	0.75	21.16	.	–5.50[b]	2.47
Skilled worker	–1.19[a]	0.70	21.96[d]	0.86	–3.19[c]	1.16
Routine nonmanual	–0.84	0.75	21.05[d]	1.13	–1.54	1.06
Service class	–1.10	0.69	21.48[d]	0.89	–2.47[b]	0.99
Self-employed	–1.69[b]	0.80	22.22[d]	0.93	–3.41[b]	1.40
Farmer	–2.75[b]	1.16	–16.65	.	0.36	1.88
Unskilled worker × trade-union	0.15	1.12	–37.31	.	3.86	2.63
Skilled worker × trade-union	0.65	0.53	–0.24	0.88	0.35	1.10
Routine nonmanual × trade-union	–0.94	0.86	–0.57	1.78	–1.27	1.21
Service class × trade-union	0.03	0.70	0.57	0.93	1.09	0.93
Catholic, low attendance	–0.11	0.64	21.13[d]	0.90	–0.73	0.90
Catholic, high attendance	–1.15	0.71	20.23[d]	0.99	–2.21[a]	1.41
Protestant, low attendance	–0.60	0.62	20.56[d]	0.88	–0.84	0.84
Protestant, high attendance	–0.07	0.85	21.39	.	0.20	1.43
Retired	–0.07	0.46	–0.43	0.71	–36.51	.
Education	0.41	0.74	0.98	0.99	–0.46	1.17
Age	–0.01	0.01	0.00	0.02	–0.09[d]	0.02
Gender	0.68[b]	0.30	0.60	0.45	0.05	0.53
Constant	1.07	0.93	–44.91[d]	1.19	0.42	1.37
N			949			
Log Likelihood			–385.1			
McFadden R^2			0.61			

a: p<0.1; b: p<0.05; c: p<0.01; d: p<0.001.
Note: Coefficients and standard errors estimated by a multinomial logistic regression. The base outcome includes respondents who voted for the CDU/CSU.

Table B12: Effect of social-structural predispositions on voting choices in Germany, 1987

	SPD		FDP		Greens	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
Party identification CDU	–13.72[d]	2.17	–2.91[d]	0.64	–7.89[d]	1.78
Party identification SPD	8.23[d]	1.02	3.65[c]	1.35	4.86[d]	1.27
Party identification FDP	–1.88	2.94	11.70[c]	2.49	–117.30	.
Party identification Greens	61.97[d]	1.28	–42.69	.	68.85	.
Unskilled worker	–0.92	0.71	–0.04	1.67	–0.94	1.01
Skilled worker	0.08	0.61	1.80	1.37	–1.42[a]	0.84
Routine nonmanual	–0.47	0.65	2.15	1.39	–3.41[c]	1.27
Service class	–0.61	0.61	2.67[b]	1.33	–1.53[b]	0.73
Self-employed	–0.99	0.71	3.06[b]	1.36	–1.18	0.88
Farmer	0.32	1.32	2.84[a]	1.70	–30.28	.
Unskilled worker × trade-union	0.93	1.26	4.28[c]	1.61	–30.79	.
Skilled worker × trade-union	0.46	0.55	0.12	1.00	1.01	0.89
Routine nonmanual × trade-union	0.57	1.01	–0.32	1.31	1.71	1.92
Service class × trade-union	0.88	0.65	0.26	0.73	1.21	0.86
Catholic, low attendance	0.15	0.58	–0.46	0.75	1.18	0.96
Catholic, high attendance	–1.23[a]	0.63	–0.88	0.81	–1.10	1.39
Protestant, low attendance	–0.29	0.56	–0.27	0.72	0.84	0.94
Protestant, high attendance	–0.80	0.91	0.16	0.98	2.25[a]	1.22
Retired	–0.62	0.43	–0.46	0.54	–0.46	0.96
Education	–0.65	0.67	0.57	0.69	1.48	0.90
Age	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	–0.05[c]	0.02
Gender	–0.38	0.29	0.29	0.35	0.44	0.45
Constant	1.26	0.81	–3.78[b]	1.52	–2.16[a]	1.23
N			1175			
Log Likelihood			–468.4			
McFadden R^2			0.63			

a: p<0.1; b: p<0.05; c: p<0.01; d: p<0.001.

Note: Coefficients and standard errors estimated by a multinomial logistic regression. The base outcome includes respondents who voted for the CDU/CSU.

Table B13: Effect of social-structural predispositions on voting choices in Germany, 1990

	SPD		FDP		Greens	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
Party identification CDU	−5.83[d]	0.81	−2.47[d]	0.54	−3.88[d]	1.07
Party identification SPD	7.71[d]	1.04	3.78[c]	1.17	4.68[d]	1.28
Party identification FDP	−3.90	3.03	5.25[d]	1.14	−102.51	.
Party identification Greens	65.24[d]	1.81	62.73	.	67.38[d]	1.82
Unskilled worker	−0.89	0.84	−22.73[d]	1.27	0.88	1.33
Skilled worker	−0.40	0.65	−0.82	0.73	0.51	1.10
Routine nonmanual	−1.27[a]	0.70	−0.52	0.71	0.04	1.22
Service class	−0.54	0.61	−0.06	0.61	0.46	1.00
Self-employed	−1.64[b]	0.75	0.14	0.67	0.32	1.13
Farmer	−33.87	.	−1.01	1.16	−2.17	4.50
Unskilled worker × trade-union	−0.32	1.20	21.94	.	0.77	1.49
Skilled worker × trade-union	1.20[a]	0.63	1.42[a]	0.75	1.26	1.04
Routine nonmanual × trade-union	0.01	1.12	−0.18	1.30	−0.12	1.80
Service class × trade-union	0.21	0.57	−0.81	0.75	1.15	0.75
Catholic, low attendance	0.04	0.62	−0.57	0.58	−0.71	0.72
Catholic, high attendance	0.09	0.71	−1.16[a]	0.69	−2.13[a]	1.23
Protestant, low attendance	0.01	0.62	−0.67	0.57	−1.19	0.75
Protestant, high attendance	−1.09	1.00	−0.90	0.87	−33.96	.
Retired	−0.17	0.49	−0.55	0.49	−0.28	1.26
Education	0.62	0.61	0.06	0.62	1.30	0.85
Age	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	−0.06[c]	0.02
Gender	0.71[b]	0.31	0.41	0.33	0.90[a]	0.48
Constant	−0.18	0.84	−0.22	0.81	−2.84[b]	1.25
N			821			
Log Likelihood			−437.0			
McFadden R^2			0.52			

a: p<0.1; b: p<0.05; c: p<0.01; d: p<0.001.

Note: Coefficients and standard errors estimated by a multinomial logistic regression. The base outcome includes respondents who voted for the CDU/CSU.

Table B14: Effect of social-structural predispositions on voting choices in Germany, 1994

	SPD		FDP		Greens	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
Party identification CDU	−9.44[d]	1.24	−2.25[c]	0.83	−11.54[d]	3.13
Party identification SPD	7.67[d]	1.35	−1.23	3.25	3.38[b]	1.57
Party identification FDP	−0.01	2.88	6.42[b]	2.60	0.49	3.55
Party identification Greens	61.44	.	−54.09	.	66.94[d]	1.06
Unskilled worker	−0.88	0.71	−39.25	.	−0.78	1.27
Skilled worker	−0.04	0.62	−0.57	0.83	0.19	0.89
Routine nonmanual	0.34	0.59	0.16	0.74	−0.41	0.87
Service class	−0.96[a]	0.53	0.58	0.64	−0.96	0.67
Self-employed	−1.52[a]	0.88	1.18	0.76	−1.69	1.06
Farmer	−0.57	1.87	−39.95	.	−36.06	.
Unskilled worker × trade-union	3.69	4.31	1.77	.	3.52	4.88
Skilled worker × trade-union	0.89	0.74	0.05	1.24	−1.06	1.23
Routine nonmanual × trade-union	−0.35	1.49	−38.41	.	1.46	1.74
Service class × trade-union	−0.09	0.62	−1.89	1.24	0.31	0.72
Catholic, low attendance	−0.55	0.53	1.71	1.44	−0.43	0.63
Catholic, high attendance	−1.61[a]	0.92	1.99	1.57	−0.30	1.12
Protestant, low attendance	−0.44	0.53	2.01	1.43	−0.48	0.63
Protestant, high attendance	−1.15	0.96	1.77	1.65	−1.14	1.37
Retired	−0.14	0.56	0.51	0.67	−1.71	1.06
Education	−0.04	0.64	−1.38[a]	0.79	2.88[d]	0.84
Age	0.01	0.01	−0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02
Gender	−0.01	0.39	−0.72	0.49	0.26	0.51
Constant	1.50[b]	0.71	−2.45	1.55	−1.19	0.93
N			707			
Log Likelihood			−327.8			
McFadden R^2			0.59			

a: $p<0.1$; b: $p<0.05$; c: $p<0.01$; d: $p<0.001$.

Note: Coefficients and standard errors estimated by a multinomial logistic regression. The base outcome includes respondents who voted for the CDU/CSU.

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Table B15: Effect of social-structural predispositions on voting choices in Germany, 1998

	SPD		FDP		Greens	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
Party identification CDU	–6.44[d]	0.72	–1.38	0.99	–8.42[d]	2.16
Party identification SPD	11.29[d]	2.21	10.46[d]	2.42	8.26[d]	2.35
Party identification FDP	–3.08	2.75	10.14[d]	2.33	–0.82	3.55
Party identification Greens	4.62	3.16	7.07[a]	3.64	11.92[d]	3.17
Unskilled worker	0.34	0.68	–31.70	.	–0.04	1.15
Skilled worker	–0.22	0.54	–0.42	1.33	–0.59	0.80
Routine nonmanual	0.77	0.59	0.77	1.18	–0.57	1.04
Service class	0.39	0.45	0.75	0.87	–0.25	0.62
Self-employed	–0.68	0.60	0.75	0.98	–1.08	0.87
Farmer	–32.73	.	–32.98	.	–31.61	.
Unskilled worker × trade-union	0.55	1.87	0.00	.	–0.15	3.16
Skilled worker × trade-union	1.10	0.86	–30.94	.	–0.62	1.75
Routine nonmanual × trade-union	24.66	15.00	20.75	.	–6.91	.
Service class × trade-union	–0.99	0.71	–1.60	1.24	0.39	0.82
Catholic, low attendance	0.10	0.45	–0.35	0.67	0.27	0.62
Catholic, high attendance	–0.75	0.53	–1.43	0.96	–0.56	0.88
Protestant, low attendance	0.14	0.43	–0.02	0.59	0.05	0.60
Protestant, high attendance	–0.59	0.67	–34.98	.	–0.91	0.97
Retired	0.80[a]	0.44	–0.55	0.88	0.35	0.76
Education	–0.55	0.58	1.16	0.88	0.71	0.83
Age	–0.03[c]	0.01	–0.01	0.02	–0.04[a]	0.02
Gender	–0.25	0.30	0.23	0.49	–0.50	0.44
Constant	0.77	0.66	–3.21[c]	1.17	–1.01	0.94
N			847			
Log Likelihood			–402.8			
McFadden R^2			0.57			

a: p<0.1; b: p<0.05; c: p<0.01; d: p<0.001.
Note: Coefficients and standard errors estimated by a multinomial logistic regression. The base outcome includes respondents who voted for the CDU/CSU.

Table B16: Effect of social-structural predispositions on voting choices in Germany, 2002

	SPD		FDP		Greens	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
Party identification CDU	–8.14[d]	1.41	–2.43[c]	0.77	–9.88[d]	2.99
Party identification SPD	9.84[d]	1.19	–95.63	.	7.50[d]	1.30
Party identification FDP	–117.24	.	6.75[d]	1.89	–118.53	.
Party identification Greens	65.68[d]	0.96	–46.07	.	69.22	.
Unskilled worker	–0.15	0.70	–0.01	1.39	–0.48	0.94
Skilled worker	–0.24	0.66	0.40	1.11	–1.04	0.94
Routine nonmanual	–0.47	0.72	1.68	1.09	–0.89	0.95
Service class	–0.50	0.56	0.82	0.94	–0.62	0.69
Self-employed	–0.42	0.73	1.60	1.02	–1.06	0.95
Farmer	–0.84	2.10	1.97	1.56	–33.56	.
Unskilled worker × trade-union	0.68	2.15	–31.64	.	1.34	2.42
Skilled worker × trade-union	–0.97	0.98	–33.50	.	–0.43	1.32
Routine nonmanual × trade-union	2.53[a]	1.50	–33.98	.	–32.41	.
Service class × trade-union	0.19	0.60	–34.03	.	0.45	0.66
Catholic, low attendance	–0.10	0.45	–0.82	0.65	–1.18[a]	0.60
Catholic, high attendance	–0.97	0.70	–0.41	0.74	–0.54	0.83
Protestant, low attendance	–0.31	0.44	–0.26	0.58	–0.44	0.51
Protestant, high attendance	0.06	0.71	–2.06	1.48	0.55	0.84
Retired	–0.53	0.49	1.13	0.71	–0.68	0.63
Education	0.54	0.68	1.31[a]	0.80	2.39[c]	0.81
Age	0.00	0.01	–0.04[b]	0.02	0.01	0.02
Gender	0.06	0.32	–0.32	0.42	–0.12	0.40
Constant	0.05	0.78	–2.77[b]	1.21	–1.32	0.96
N			782			
Log Likelihood			–401.7			
McFadden R^2			0.54			

a: p<0.1; b: p<0.05; c: p<0.01; d: p<0.001.

Note: Coefficients and standard errors estimated by a multinomial logistic regression. The base outcome includes respondents who voted for the CDU/CSU.

Table B17: Effect of social-structural predispositions on voting choices in Switzerland, 1971

	Center		Liberal Right		Conservative Right	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
Party identification Left	−2.24[d]	0.32	−2.41[d]	0.37	−2.91[d]	0.46
Party identification Center	1.80[d]	0.34	0.39	0.40	0.12	0.45
Party identification Liberal Right	0.95	0.60	3.17[d]	0.56	1.29[b]	0.63
Party identification Cons. Right	−0.26	0.47	0.15	0.48	1.91[d]	0.43
Unskilled worker	−0.65	0.59	0.60	0.73	0.99	0.85
Skilled worker	−0.55	0.55	−0.04	0.71	0.85	0.81
Routine nonmanual	−0.46	0.76	0.93	0.85	1.50	0.96
Service class	1.20[b]	0.55	1.91[c]	0.69	2.14[c]	0.81
Self-employed	0.86	0.55	2.05[c]	0.68	2.26[c]	0.80
Farmer	0.03	0.74	1.23	0.87	2.50[c]	0.92
Unskilled worker × trade-union	−0.03	0.59	0.47	0.63	−0.10	0.72
Skilled worker × trade-union	−0.76	0.47	−0.57	0.58	−0.91	0.59
Routine nonmanual × trade-union	−0.26	0.90	−0.16	0.92	−1.21	1.08
Service class × trade-union	−1.13[b]	0.45	−0.92[a]	0.48	−1.02[a]	0.55
Catholic, low attendance	1.32[b]	0.58	1.18[a]	0.64	0.10	0.69
Catholic, high attendance	2.85[d]	0.61	1.47[b]	0.68	0.52	0.74
Protestant, low attendance	1.41[b]	0.57	1.54[b]	0.61	1.50[b]	0.64
Protestant, high attendance	1.57[b]	0.66	0.92	0.73	1.43[b]	0.73
Age	−0.02[b]	0.01	−0.01	0.01	−0.03[c]	0.01
Education	0.18	0.35	0.40	0.39	−0.83[b]	0.42
Retired	0.11	0.46	0.60	0.47	0.85	0.52
Gender	0.13	0.24	0.28	0.26	0.23	0.28
Constant	−0.22	0.84	−2.09[b]	1.00	−0.79	1.09
N			981			
Log Likelihood			−830.50			
McFadden R^2			0.37			

a: p<0.1; b: p<0.05; c: p<0.01; d: p<0.001.

Note: Coefficients and standard errors estimated by a multinomial logistic regression. The base outcome includes respondents who voted for a Left party.

Table B18: Effect of social-structural predispositions on voting choices in Switzerland, 1975

	Center		Liberal Right		Conservative Right	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
Party identification Left	−3.37[d]	0.52	−2.77[d]	0.53	−3.81[d]	1.07
Party identification Center	2.86[d]	0.64	0.21	0.81	0.64	0.91
Party identification Liberal Right	0.56	0.59	3.18[d]	0.54	−0.51	0.91
Party identification Cons. Right	0.76	1.33	1.76	1.23	4.88[d]	1.24
Unskilled worker	0.25	1.07	1.48	1.27	2.20	1.51
Skilled worker	−0.40	0.92	0.34	1.14	0.14	1.51
Routine nonmanual	−0.52	0.98	−1.40	1.30	1.23	1.51
Administrative specialist	0.15	0.98	1.78	1.16	1.64	1.49
Technical expert	−0.77	0.95	0.88	1.15	−0.71	1.66
Social-cultural specialist	0.20	1.07	0.72	1.31	1.47	1.62
Self-employed	−0.25	1.05	1.76	1.21	1.10	1.60
Farmer	0.67	1.19	1.79	1.39	2.95[a]	1.60
Unskilled worker × trade-union	−1.47[a]	0.86	−1.92[a]	0.99	−1.56	1.01
Skilled worker × trade-union	−1.33[b]	0.65	−0.30	0.69	−2.63[b]	1.31
Routine nonmanual × trade-union	−0.96	1.19	1.69	1.31	−0.53	1.45
Administrative × trade-union	−1.45[a]	0.87	−0.55	0.81	−0.63	1.05
Technical × trade-union	1.49	0.92	0.06	1.02	1.77	1.59
Social-cultural × trade-union	−1.04	1.11	−0.32	1.25	−2.15	2.23
Catholic, low attendance	−0.51	0.73	0.71	0.86	−1.15	1.24
Catholic, high attendance	0.91	0.71	1.00	0.85	0.00	1.10
Protestant, low attendance	−0.63	0.68	0.38	0.81	0.31	1.02
Protestant, high attendance	−0.21	0.77	0.22	0.91	0.53	1.10
Age	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02
Education	0.62	0.50	0.79	0.52	−0.04	0.70
Retired	−0.07	0.68	−0.24	0.74	0.85	0.81
Gender	−0.36	0.35	0.12	0.37	0.04	0.47
Constant	0.62	1.30	−2.43	1.57	−1.97	1.94
N			586			
Log Likelihood			−402.3			
McFadden R^2			0.48			

a: p<0.1; b: p<0.05; c: p<0.01; d: p<0.001.
Note: Coefficients and standard errors estimated by a multinomial logistic regression. The base outcome includes respondents who voted for a Left party.

Table B19: Effect of social-structural predispositions on voting choices in Switzerland, 1979

	Center		Liberal Right		Conservative Right	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
Party identification Left	–3.62[d]	0.78	–2.73[d]	0.53	–1.57[c]	0.57
Party identification Center	2.86[d]	0.65	0.62	0.75	1.13	0.89
Party identification Liberal Right	0.14	0.72	3.20[d]	0.57	0.80	0.83
Party identification Cons. Right	0.24	0.66	–1.91[a]	1.14	2.47[d]	0.63
Unskilled worker	–1.13	1.05	0.72	0.99	0.91	1.49
Skilled worker	–0.56	0.63	–0.07	0.72	1.43	1.22
Routine nonmanual	–0.37	0.70	0.65	0.76	0.63	1.34
Service class	–0.23	0.57	0.99	0.63	1.58	1.17
Self-employed	1.23[a]	0.73	2.18[c]	0.78	3.08[b]	1.26
Farmer	0.97	1.41	0.47	2.00	3.42[b]	1.57
Catholic, low attendance	1.20[a]	0.71	1.11	0.70	–0.78	1.01
Catholic, high attendance	3.44[d]	0.85	2.66[c]	0.87	0.88	1.14
Protestant, low attendance	0.39	0.66	0.70	0.64	0.88	0.80
Protestant, high attendance	1.52[a]	0.92	1.57	0.96	–0.46	1.43
Age	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.02
Education	1.04[b]	0.50	0.13	0.49	–0.46	0.60
Retired	0.34	0.62	0.17	0.60	–1.02	0.74
Gender	0.13	0.34	–0.30	0.33	–0.14	0.42
Constant	–1.60	1.14	–1.59	1.16	–3.56[b]	1.69
N			531			
Log Likelihood			–396.5			
McFadden R^2			0.43			

a: $p<0.1$; b: $p<0.05$; c: $p<0.01$; d: $p<0.001$.

Note: Coefficients and standard errors estimated by a multinomial logistic regression. The base outcome includes respondents who voted for a Left party.

Table B20: Effect of social-structural predispositions on voting choices in Switzerland, 1987

	Center		Liberal Right		Conservative Right	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
Party identification Left	–3.09[d]	0.66	–4.22[d]	1.06	–3.92[d]	1.05
Party identification Center	2.08[d]	0.50	–1.62[a]	0.88	–1.14	0.89
Party identification Liberal Right	0.96	0.76	3.96[d]	0.65	0.55	0.88
Party identification Cons. Right	1.50[a]	0.89	–0.30	1.33	3.69[d]	0.81
Unskilled worker	1.00	2.24	1.64	2.34	–0.49	2.48
Skilled worker	–0.80	1.14	–2.16	1.34	0.93	1.21
Routine nonmanual	–1.08	1.02	–2.06[a]	1.25	–38.49	.
Service class	0.28	0.59	0.19	0.67	0.80	0.70
Self-employed	–0.50	0.66	–1.36[a]	0.79	–0.83	0.87
Farmer	22.01[d]	1.08	20.91	.	23.35[d]	1.12
Unskilled worker × trade-union	–0.81	2.64	–1.74	2.74	–36.94	.
Skilled worker × trade-union	–1.13	1.45	1.25	1.71	–0.28	1.43
Routine nonmanual × trade-union	–36.40	.	–35.67	.	0.51	.
Service class × trade-union	–0.88	0.72	–0.46	0.83	–0.42	0.82
Catholic	1.49[b]	0.63	2.37[c]	0.80	0.12	0.76
Protestant	0.16	0.63	1.09	0.77	0.30	0.71
Age	0.05[c]	0.02	0.06[c]	0.02	0.04[b]	0.02
Education	1.14[b]	0.56	0.69	0.61	–0.18	0.67
Retired	–2.32[c]	0.87	–2.82[c]	0.93	–2.08[b]	1.02
Gender	–0.25	0.42	–0.31	0.47	0.23	0.52
Constant	–3.16[c]	1.05	–4.35[d]	1.28	–2.68[b]	1.22
N			453			
Log Likelihood			–303.1			
McFadden R^2			0.5			

a: p<0.1; b: p<0.05; c: p<0.01; d: p<0.001.

Note: Coefficients and standard errors estimated by a multinomial logistic regression. The base outcome includes respondents who voted for a Left party.

Table B21: Effect of social-structural predispositions on voting choices in Switzerland, 1991

	Center		Liberal Right		Conservative Right	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
Party identification Left	–3.58[d]	0.64	–5.26[d]	1.10	–5.06[d]	1.08
Party identification Center	3.37[d]	0.73	–34.48	.	–34.52	.
Party identification Liberal Right	0.32	0.92	3.52[d]	0.78	–1.05	1.28
Party identification Cons. Right	–0.68	1.31	–0.01	1.09	3.61[d]	0.86
Worker	–0.56	1.03	–1.03	1.11	0.74	1.39
Routine nonmanual	–0.63	1.25	–1.24	1.34	–0.61	1.60
Service class	–0.71	1.06	–0.86	1.12	0.63	1.42
Self-employed	0.08	1.07	0.62	1.11	1.61	1.43
Farmer	1.48	1.62	–0.24	1.88	2.14	1.93
Worker × trade-union	–0.19	1.04	–0.66	1.23	–0.50	1.01
Routine nonmanual × trade-union	–1.32	1.90	–1.84	1.66	0.07	2.71
Service class × trade-union	0.31	0.91	–0.26	1.04	–0.47	1.14
Catholic	0.33	1.00	–0.61	1.02	0.83	1.23
Protestant	–0.25	0.96	–1.13	0.97	0.77	1.16
Age	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02
Education	–0.32	0.89	–1.81[a]	1.00	–1.58	1.11
Retired	–1.53	1.01	–1.02	1.02	–1.28	1.09
Gender	–0.16	0.51	–0.63	0.56	–0.43	0.55
Constant	–0.50	1.73	2.37	1.87	–0.53	2.21
N			481			
Log Likelihood			–202.1			
McFadden R^2			0.69			

a: $p<0.1$; b: $p<0.05$; c: $p<0.01$; d: $p<0.001$.

Note: Coefficients and standard errors estimated by a multinomial logistic regression. The base outcome includes respondents who voted for a Left party.

Table B22: Effect of social-structural predispositions on voting choices in Switzerland, 1995

	Center		Liberal Right		Conservative Right	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
Party identification Left	−2.93[d]	0.54	−3.25[d]	0.47	−36.64	.
Party identification Center	3.25[d]	0.42	0.24	0.54	0.17	0.61
Party identification Liberal Right	0.40	0.60	3.25[d]	0.39	0.36	0.54
Party identification Cons. Right	1.71	1.24	1.96[a]	1.11	5.37[d]	1.03
Unskilled worker	0.00	0.72	0.33	0.69	1.30[b]	0.65
Skilled worker	−0.35	0.64	0.05	0.60	0.57	0.59
Routine nonmanual	−0.78	0.82	0.82	0.65	−1.87[a]	1.12
Administrative specialist	−0.20	0.54	0.61	0.49	−0.27	0.55
Technical expert	0.15	0.58	0.99[a]	0.53	0.55	0.56
Social-cultural specialist	−0.79	0.61	0.44	0.52	−0.59	0.62
Self-employed	0.90	0.63	0.98	0.61	0.49	0.65
Farmer	2.02[a]	1.03	1.03	1.07	2.07[b]	1.05
Unskilled worker × trade-union	−0.05	1.06	−0.25	0.99	−0.33	0.84
Skilled worker × trade-union	−0.46	0.84	0.62	0.67	−0.77	0.72
Routine nonmanual × trade-union	0.76	1.37	−0.21	1.06	0.43	1.83
Administrative × trade-union	−0.44	0.58	−0.12	0.45	−0.32	0.58
Technical × trade-union	0.47	0.64	−0.35	0.61	−0.34	0.68
Social-cultural × trade-union	−0.70	0.74	−0.97	0.69	0.06	0.79
Catholic, low attendance	0.09	0.42	0.47	0.37	−0.29	0.41
Catholic, high attendance	0.83[b]	0.41	0.26	0.41	−0.21	0.44
Protestant, low attendance	−0.62	0.41	0.22	0.34	−0.06	0.36
Protestant, high attendance	−0.27	0.56	−0.07	0.49	−0.68	0.55
Age	0.01	0.01	0.03[b]	0.01	0.03[c]	0.01
Education	0.01	0.42	−0.09	0.36	−0.38	0.41
Retired	−0.06	0.48	−0.27	0.40	−0.74[a]	0.45
Gender	0.05	0.27	0.07	0.23	−0.13	0.26
Constant	−1.16	0.85	−2.31[c]	0.76	−1.66[b]	0.83
N			1060			
Log Likelihood			−782.2			
McFadden R^2			0.45			

a: p<0.1; b: p<0.05; c: p<0.01; d: p<0.001.

Note: Coefficients and standard errors estimated by a multinomial logistic regression. The base outcome includes respondents who voted for a Left party.

Table B23: Effect of social-structural predispositions on voting choices in Switzerland, 1999 postelectoral survey

	Center		Liberal Right		Conservative Right	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
Party identification Left	–3.54[d]	0.61	–3.87[d]	0.60	–4.56[d]	0.73
Party identification Center	3.54[d]	0.55	–1.33	1.13	0.10	0.68
Party identification Liberal Right	0.93	0.84	4.14[d]	0.61	0.60	0.75
Party identification Cons. Right	–0.71	1.14	0.53	0.67	3.13[d]	0.54
Unskilled worker	0.77	0.67	0.09	0.64	0.99[a]	0.55
Skilled worker	0.21	0.56	–0.21	0.52	–0.15	0.48
Routine nonmanual	0.44	0.64	–0.20	0.60	0.18	0.56
Administrative specialist	0.54	0.51	0.27	0.45	0.44	0.43
Technical expert	0.21	0.55	–0.30	0.48	–0.36	0.48
Social-cultural specialist	–1.33[b]	0.64	–1.25[b]	0.52	–1.46[c]	0.55
Self-employed	0.69	0.71	1.35[b]	0.58	0.79	0.59
Farmer	1.11	1.30	2.16[a]	1.14	2.13[a]	1.11
Unskilled worker × trade-union	–4.28[c]	1.42	–1.95[b]	1.09	–1.46[b]	0.73
Skilled worker × trade-union	0.14	0.71	0.61	0.65	0.59	0.59
Routine nonmanual × trade-union	–32.75	.	–32.14	.	–1.78[a]	1.03
Administrative × trade-union	–0.22	0.64	–0.77	0.62	–0.44	0.55
Technical × trade-union	–0.37	0.75	–0.78	0.75	–0.45	0.73
Social-cultural × trade-union	0.48	0.80	–0.39	0.78	0.58	0.69
Catholic, low attendance	–0.09	0.40	0.19	0.35	–0.16	0.34
Catholic, high attendance	1.20[b]	0.47	0.56	0.47	0.25	0.45
Protestant, low attendance	–0.68[a]	0.41	0.01	0.34	0.01	0.32
Protestant, high attendance	1.16[b]	0.55	0.86	0.53	0.88[a]	0.49
Age	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01
Education	–0.48	0.43	0.78[a]	0.40	–0.62[a]	0.37
Retired	–0.12	0.43	0.08	0.39	0.09	0.36
Gender	0.27	0.26	0.12	0.23	–0.38[a]	0.22
Constant	–0.62	0.81	–1.13	0.72	0.42	0.66
N			1169			
Log Likelihood			–906.9			
McFadden R^2			0.42			

a: $p<0.1$; b: $p<0.05$; c: $p<0.01$; d: $p<0.001$.

Note: Coefficients and standard errors estimated by a multinomial logistic regression. The base outcome includes respondents who voted for a Left party.

Table B24: Effect of social-structural predispositions on voting choices in Switzerland, 1999 panel survey

	Center		Liberal Right		Conservative Right	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
Party identification Left	–2.66[d]	0.43	–3.35[d]	0.47	–3.63[d]	0.52
Party identification Center	2.78[d]	0.46	–0.78	0.73	0.28	0.55
Party identification Liberal Right	0.01	0.67	3.23[d]	0.44	0.98[a]	0.52
Party identification Cons. Right	0.52	0.84	–0.96	1.17	3.21[d]	0.62
Unskilled worker	–0.32	0.56	–0.13	0.52	0.44	0.50
Skilled worker	–0.08	0.56	0.15	0.49	0.68	0.49
Routine nonmanual	0.46	0.59	0.25	0.53	0.92[a]	0.52
Administrative specialist	0.26	0.45	0.63	0.39	0.53	0.42
Technical expert	0.27	0.49	0.04	0.43	–0.07	0.46
Social-cultural specialist	–0.38	0.53	–0.23	0.44	–0.48	0.50
Self-employed	0.98	0.61	0.90	0.55	1.44[c]	0.55
Farmer	2.84[b]	1.22	2.76[b]	1.24	3.25[c]	1.23
Unskilled worker × trade-union	–0.79	0.83	–33.32	.	–0.28	0.66
Skilled worker × trade-union	0.01	0.62	–0.71	0.64	–0.13	0.52
Routine nonmanual × trade-union	–1.24	0.99	–33.42	.	–0.46	0.74
Administrative × trade-union	–0.36	0.47	–1.56[c]	0.49	–0.83[a]	0.44
Technical × trade-union	–0.12	0.62	–0.20	0.56	0.10	0.58
Social-cultural × trade-union	0.03	0.61	–0.85	0.59	–0.55	0.68
Catholic, low attendance	1.27[d]	0.35	0.87[c]	0.28	0.64[b]	0.29
Catholic, high attendance	2.31[d]	0.39	0.74[b]	0.36	0.86[b]	0.35
Protestant, low attendance	–0.25	0.40	0.26	0.28	0.36	0.28
Protestant, high attendance	0.70	0.54	0.57	0.46	0.35	0.48
Age	0.00	0.01	0.02[a]	0.01	0.01	0.01
Education	–1.06[c]	0.35	–0.41	0.33	–0.95[c]	0.31
Retired	–0.02	0.38	–0.36	0.35	–0.35	0.34
Gender	–0.25	0.22	–0.44[b]	0.20	–0.48[b]	0.20
Constant	–0.83	0.71	–1.01	0.62	–0.54	0.63
N			1325			
Log Likelihood			–1156.2			
McFadden R^2			0.36			

a: p<0.1; b: p<0.05; c: p<0.01; d: p<0.001.

Note: Coefficients and standard errors estimated by a multinomial logistic regression. The base outcome includes respondents who voted for a Left party.

Table B25: Effect of social-structural predispositions on voting choices in Switzerland, 2003

	Center		Liberal Right		Conservative Right	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
Party identification Left	−3.15[d]	0.43	−3.68[d>]	0.52	−3.87[d]	0.44
Party identification Center	4.53[d]	0.77	0.68	1.02	−0.75	1.24
Party identification Liberal Right	−33.32	.	4.35[d]	0.62	0.71	0.71
Party identification Cons. Right	2.08[a]	1.14	1.32	1.24	5.10[d]	1.02
Unskilled worker	−1.83[b]	0.78	−0.43	0.59	0.20	0.45
Skilled worker	0.21	0.56	0.14	0.53	0.50	0.44
Routine nonmanual	0.06	0.61	0.21	0.55	0.11	0.48
Administrative specialist	0.32	0.49	−0.06	0.44	0.29	0.38
Technical expert	0.24	0.52	0.06	0.46	0.01	0.41
Social-cultural specialist	0.53	0.50	0.12	0.48	−0.63	0.47
Self-employed	−0.25	0.72	0.48	0.59	0.21	0.54
Farmer	0.11	1.29	0.15	1.35	2.23[b]	0.95
Unskilled worker × trade-union	1.81[a]	1.07	−0.04	1.15	−0.48	0.83
Skilled worker × trade-union	0.90	0.88	−35.05	.	−0.36	0.86
Routine nonmanual × trade-union	−0.43	1.22	−2.46	1.75	−0.44	0.94
Administrative × trade-union	−1.10	0.88	−0.23	0.70	−1.35[a]	0.77
Technical × trade-union	−2.06[a]	1.23	−0.67	0.87	−1.22	0.97
Social-cultural × trade-union	−1.46	0.89	−0.63	0.73	−0.71	0.90
Catholic, low attendance	1.00[c]	0.36	0.10	0.34	−0.02	0.29
Catholic, high attendance	2.78[d]	0.42	0.56	0.47	0.29	0.41
Protestant, low attendance	−0.14	0.41	0.43	0.30	0.01	0.26
Protestant, high attendance	1.17[b]	0.53	0.57	0.48	0.26	0.44
Age	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02[c]	0.01
Education	−0.57	0.40	0.36	0.39	−0.80[b]	0.32
Retired	0.04	0.43	0.46	0.38	0.02	0.34
Gender	−0.03	0.26	0.05	0.24	−0.27	0.21
Constant	−1.02	0.70	−1.61[b]	0.67	−0.78	0.56
N			1276			
Log Likelihood			−864.8			
McFadden R^2			0.49			

a: $p<0.1$; b: $p<0.05$; c: $p<0.01$; d: $p<0.001$.

Note: Coefficients and standard errors estimated by a multinomial logistic regression. The base outcome includes respondents who voted for a Left party.

Figure B5: Proportion of split-ticket voters in Germany, 1969–2002

Figure B6: Proportion of split-ticket voters in Switzerland, 1971–2003

Table B26: Descriptive statistics for the baseline model of voting choice in Germany, 1972–1990

	1972		1976		1983		1987		1990	
	Mean	Std. dev.	Mean	Std. dev.	Mean	Std. dev.	Mean	Std. dev.	Mean	Std. dev.
Left-right position			0.52	0.22	0.52	0.22	0.52	0.24	0.54	0.24
Party identification government	0.35	0.37	0.30	0.34	0.22	0.31	0.23	0.31	0.28	0.36
Party identification opposition	0.18	0.32	0.22	0.32	0.23	0.32	0.23	0.31	0.25	0.35
Government's performance	0.73	0.26	0.67	0.27	0.58	0.27	0.61	0.28	0.67	0.24
Economic situation	0.65	0.17	0.57	0.17	0.47	0.17	0.62	0.16	0.89	0.23
Sympathy CDU candidate	0.48	0.33	0.69	0.26	0.69	0.27	0.59	0.32	0.72	0.27
Sympathy SPD candidate	0.78	0.29	0.73	0.27	0.62	0.25	0.61	0.28	0.59	0.29

Table B27: Descriptive statistics for the baseline model of voting choice in Switzerland, 1999

	Mean	Std. dev.
Left-right position	0.51	0.21
Party identification Left	0.12	0.27
Party identification Center	0.08	0.23
Party identification Liberal Right	0.08	0.24
Party identification Conservative Right	0.04	0.18
Tightening asylum policy	0.65	0.32
Reduction working time	0.48	0.31
Increase VAT	0.45	0.28
Maternity insurance	0.55	0.35
Deficit reduction	0.60	0.25
European Union	0.60	0.32
Bilateral Agreements	0.75	0.24
Sympathy Ruth Dreifuss	0.59	0.28
Sympathy Ruth Metzler	0.67	0.24
Sympathy Franz Steinegger	0.67	0.21
Sympathy Christoph Blocher	0.36	0.35
Geneva	0.29	0.45
Zurich	0.33	0.47

Table B28: Stability of evaluations of the economic situation by level of predisposition strength in Germany, 1972–1990

	Weak predispositions			Strong predispositions		
	Waves 1 – 2	Waves 2 – 3	N	Waves 1 – 2	Waves 2 – 3	N
1972	0.39	0.46	530	0.49	0.52	535
1976	0.43	0.40	526	0.51	0.49	529
1983	0.29	0.34	473	0.36	0.41	474
1987	0.34	0.46	583	0.43	0.50	585
1990	0.39	0.23	394	0.40	0.29	401

Table B29: Stability of the sympathy for the CDU candidate by level of predisposition strength in Germany, 1972–1990

	Weak predispositions			Strong predispositions		
	Waves 1 – 2	Waves 2 – 3	N	Waves 1 – 2	Waves 2 – 3	N
1972	0.60	0.56	542	0.76	0.74	542
1976	0.55	0.62	515	0.71	0.72	523
1983	0.60	0.67	462	0.63	0.76	471
1987	0.64		585	0.69		586
1990	0.65	0.62	391	0.71	0.65	396

Table B30: Stability of the sympathy for the SPD candidate by level of predisposition strength in Germany, 1972–1990

	Weak predispositions			Strong predispositions		
	Waves 1 – 2	Waves 2 – 3	N	Waves 1 – 2	Waves 2 – 3	N
1972	0.65	0.67	541	0.83	0.81	545
1976	0.56	0.61	518	0.69	0.75	525
1983	0.48	0.62	459	0.55	0.72	468
1987	0.53		581	0.71		582
1990	0.63	0.46	388	0.73	0.59	394

Table B31: Stability of issue positions by level of predisposition strength in Switzerland, 1999

	Low sophistication			High sophistication		
	Waves 1 – 2	Waves 2 – 3	N	Waves 1 – 2	Waves 2 – 3	N
Asylum policy	0.65	0.67	627	0.73	0.74	624
Working time	0.67	0.70	639	0.74	0.75	627
VAT	0.53	0.56	621	0.59	0.60	610
Maternity insurance	0.74	0.80	624	0.79	0.79	618
Deficit reduction	0.47	0.51	611	0.44	0.53	598
European Union	0.78	0.79	624	0.78	0.79	627
Bilateral agreements	0.55	0.62	572	0.53	0.63	591

Table B32: Stability of politicians' evaluations by level of predisposition strength in Switzerland, 1999

	Low sophistication			High sophistication		
	Waves 1 – 2	Waves 2 – 3	N	Waves 1 – 2	Waves 2 – 3	N
Ruth Dreifuss	0.77	0.80	654	0.85	0.84	660
Ruth Metzler	0.66	0.81	612	0.80	0.80	606
Franz Steinegger	0.63	0.63	516	0.74	0.70	509
Christoph Blocher	0.85	0.85	647	0.88	0.87	644

Table B33: Effect of political sophistication and of the Index of Predisposition Strength on the stability of left-right positions in Germany, first to second panel wave, 1976–1990

	1976	1983	1987	1990
Mean				
Left-right position $_{t-1}$	0.61[d]	0.52[d]	0.59[d]	0.57[d]
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Political sophistication	–0.02	–0.03	–0.04[a]	–0.00
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
IPS	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Left-right $_{t-1}$ × Soph.	0.36[c]	0.33[c]	0.10	0.32[b]
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.14)
Left-right $_{t-1}$ × IPS	0.27[b]	0.17	0.19[b]	0.11
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.13)
Constant	–0.01[a]	–0.01	–0.00	–0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Log Var				
Political sophistication	–0.32	–0.64[c]	0.10	–0.53[b]
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.24)
IPS	0.25	0.33	0.67[d]	0.61[c]
	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.18)	(0.24)
Constant	–3.59[d]	–3.41[d]	–3.38[d]	–3.52[d]
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)
N	958	915	1153	631
VWLS R^2	0.41	0.32	0.38	0.38

a: p<0.1; b: p<0.05; c: p<0.01; d: p<0.001.
Note: Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) estimated by a multiplicative heteroscedastic regression.

Table B34: Effect of political sophistication and of the Index of Predisposition Strength on the stability of the sympathy for the SPD candidate in Germany, first to second panel wave, 1972–1990

	1972	1976	1983	1987	1990
Mean					
Sympathy $_{t-1}$	0.71[d]	0.66[d]	0.62[d]	0.63[d]	0.70[d]
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Political sophistication	–0.05[a]	–0.04	–0.04	–0.02	–0.03
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
IPS	0.00	–0.09[c]	–0.08[b]	–0.02	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Sympathy $_{t-1}$ × Soph.	0.30[d]	0.09	0.34[b]	–0.14	0.06
	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Sympathy $_{t-1}$ × IPS	0.21[c]	0.20[a]	0.41[c]	0.47[d]	0.35[c]
	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Constant	0.04[d]	0.03[d]	–0.03[d]	–0.02[d]	–0.04[d]
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Log Var					
Political sophistication	–0.68[d]	–0.11	–0.96[d]	–0.14	–0.49[b]
	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.22)
IPS	0.09	0.16	0.35	0.10	–0.25
	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.21)
Constant	–3.35[d]	–3.14[d]	–2.97[d]	–3.11[d]	–3.02[d]
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)
N	1085	1035	927	1157	781
VWLS R^2	0.62	0.41	0.30	0.41	0.48

a: p<0.1; b: p<0.05; c: p<0.01; d: p<0.001.
Note: Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) estimated by a multiplicative heteroscedastic regression.

Table B35: Effect of political sophistication and of the Index of Predisposition Strength on the stability of the evaluation of the government's performance in Germany, first to second panel wave, 1972–1990

	1972	1976	1983	1987	1990
Mean					
Performance $_{t-1}$	0.63[d]	0.68[d]	0.54[d]	0.62[d]	0.56[d]
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Political sophistication	–0.07[c]	–0.07[b]	–0.05	–0.04	–0.04
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
IPS	–0.01	–0.04	0.15[d]	0.06[b]	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Performance $_{t-1}$ × Soph.	0.30[c]	0.34[d]	0.32[c]	0.08	0.34[c]
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.11)
Performance $_{t-1}$ × IPS	0.10	0.20[b]	0.33[c]	0.24[b]	0.30[c]
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Constant	0.06[d]	0.03[d]	–0.01	0.00	0.05[d]
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Log Var					
Political sophistication	–0.64[d]	–0.35[a]	–0.19	0.36[a]	0.01
	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.21)
IPS	0.45[c]	0.27	0.03	–0.07	0.08
	(0.16)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.20)
Constant	–3.35[d]	–3.35[d]	–3.14[d]	–3.14[d]	–3.33[d]
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)
N	1090	1040	941	1162	790
VWLS R^2	0.50	0.51	0.38	0.44	0.39

a: $p<0.1$; b: $p<0.05$; c: $p<0.01$; d: $p<0.001$.
Note: Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) estimated by a multiplicative heteroscedastic regression.

Table B36: Effect of political sophistication and of the Index of Predisposition Strength on the stability of the evaluation of the economic situation in Germany, first to second panel wave, 1972–1990

	1972	1976	1983	1987	1990
Mean					
Economic situation $_{t-1}$	0.36[d]	0.43[d]	0.32[d]	0.33[d]	0.36[d]
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Political sophistication	0.00	0.06[c]	0.06	0.03	0.05
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)
IPS	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Economic sit. $_{t-1}$ × Soph.	0.17[a]	–0.01	0.22[a]	0.09	0.17
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.14)
Economic sit. $_{t-1}$ × IPS	0.16[a]	0.10	–0.01	0.12	0.08
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.14)
Constant	0.05[d]	0.01	–0.10[d]	0.04[d]	0.10[d]
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Log Var					
Political sophistication	0.07	–0.74[d]	0.00	–0.03	–0.49[b]
	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.21)
IPS	–0.18	0.13	0.18	0.07	–0.33
	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.20)
Constant	–3.77[d]	–3.87[d]	–3.53[d]	–3.77[d]	–3.58[d]
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
N	1063	1048	947	1165	794
VWLS R^2	0.21	0.24	0.11	0.15	0.18

a: $p<0.1$; b: $p<0.05$; c: $p<0.01$; d: $p<0.001$.
Note: Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) estimated by a multiplicative heteroscedastic regression.

Table B37: Effect of political sophistication and of the Index of Predisposition Strength on the stability of the evaluation of the economic situation in Germany, second to third panel wave, 1972–1990

	1972	1976	1983	1987	1990
Mean					
Economic situation $_{t-1}$	0.46[d]	0.45[d]	0.35[d]	0.47[d]	0.32[d]
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Political sophistication	–0.01	0.02	0.05[a]	0.00	0.18[d]
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)
IPS	–0.02	–0.02	0.08[c]	0.03[a]	–0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Economic sit. $_{t-1}$ × Soph.	0.26[b]	0.17	–0.04	–0.15	–0.21
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.18)
Economic sit. $_{t-1}$ × IPS	0.19[b]	0.07	0.24[a]	0.16	0.14
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.17)
Constant	0.04[d]	0.00	–0.05[d]	0.02[d]	0.24[d]
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Log Var					
Political sophistication	0.00	–0.01	0.15	0.03	–1.16[d]
	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.21)
IPS	0.03	0.13	0.27	0.37[b]	–0.19
	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.20)
Constant	–3.87[d]	–3.84[d]	–3.68[d]	–3.91[d]	–2.96[d]
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
N	1063	1048	947	1165	794
VWLS R^2	0.24	0.21	0.15	0.24	0.09

a: $p<0.1$; b: $p<0.05$; c: $p<0.01$; d: $p<0.001$.
Note: Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) estimated by a multiplicative heteroscedastic regression.

Table B38: Effect of political sophistication and of the Index of Predisposition Strength on the stability of the sympathy for the CDU candidate in Germany, first to second panel wave, 1972–1990

	1972	1976	1983	1987	1990
Mean					
Sympathy $_{t-1}$	0.67[d]	0.63[d]	0.60[d]	0.66[d]	0.60[d]
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Political sophistication	–0.05	–0.05	–0.09[c]	–0.07[b]	–0.05[a]
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
IPS	–0.02	–0.02	0.13[d]	0.08[c]	0.06[a]
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Sympathy $_{t-1}$ × Soph.	0.22[b]	0.32[c]	0.16	0.13	0.36[d]
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Sympathy $_{t-1}$ × IPS	0.35[d]	0.56[d]	0.19	0.18[a]	0.19[a]
	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Constant	–0.01	0.02[c]	0.02[b]	0.01	0.09[d]
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Log Var					
Political sophistication	–0.50[c]	–0.51[b]	–0.25	0.06	–0.26
	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.22)
IPS	–0.13	–0.42[b]	–0.19	0.01	–0.37[a]
	(0.16)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.21)
Constant	–2.82[d]	–3.25[d]	–2.99[d]	–2.90[d]	–3.17[d]
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)
N	1082	1030	933	1165	786
VWLS R^2	0.51	0.45	0.42	0.46	0.50

a: $p<0.1$; b: $p<0.05$; c: $p<0.01$; d: $p<0.001$.
Note: Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) estimated by a multiplicative heteroscedastic regression.

Table B39: Effect of political sophistication and of the Index of Predisposition Strength on the stability of the sympathy for the CDU candidate in Germany, second to third panel wave, 1972–1990

	1972	1976	1983	1990
Mean				
Sympathy $_{t-1}$	0.64^d	0.64^d	0.66^d	0.53^d
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Political sophistication	0.02	–0.03	–0.02	–0.21^d
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
IPS	0.07^b	–0.05	0.15^d	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Sympathy $_{t-1}$ × Soph.	0.05	0.04	0.08	0.59^d
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.11)
Sympathy $_{t-1}$ × IPS	0.35^d	0.54^d	0.15	0.11
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Constant	–0.05^d	0.04^d	0.08^d	0.10^d
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Log Var				
Political sophistication	–0.31^a	–0.47^b	–0.03	–0.20
	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.22)
IPS	–0.18	–0.04	–0.67^c	–0.15
	(0.16)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Constant	–2.81^d	–3.37^d	–3.42^d	–3.18^d
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
N	1082	1030	933	786
VWLS R^2	0.46	0.49	0.56	0.46

a: $p<0.1$; b: $p<0.05$; c: $p<0.01$; d: $p<0.001$.

Note: Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) estimated by a multiplicative heteroscedastic regression.

Table B40: Effect of political sophistication and of the Index of Predisposition Strength on the stability of issue positions in Switzerland, first to second panel wave, 1999

	Asylum policy	Working time	VAT	Maternity insurance	Deficit reduction	European Union	Bilateral agreements
Mean							
Issue position $_{t-1}$	0.67^d	0.70^d	0.55^d	0.71^d	0.45^d	0.73^d	0.52^d
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Political sophistication	–0.01^a	–0.01	0.01	–0.01	0.01^b	0.00	0.04^d
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
IPS	–0.06^c	0.00	0.01	0.07^d	–0.01	–0.01	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Issue position $_{t-1}$*Soph.	0.06^c	0.04^b	0.03	0.05^c	0.02	0.00	–0.04^a
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Issue position $_{t-1}$*IPS	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.09^a	–0.01	0.06	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.08)
Constant	0.01^a	0.00	–0.02^b	–0.01	–0.01	0.03^d	0.02^d
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Log Var							
Political sophistication	–0.08^b	–0.07	–0.11^b	–0.08^a	–0.17^d	–0.11^c	–0.22^d
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
IPS	0.11	–0.08	–0.02	–0.13	0.21	0.16	0.13
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Constant	–2.89^d	–3.00^d	–2.83^d	–2.91^d	–3.00^d	–3.21^d	–3.25^d
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
N	1251	1266	1231	1242	1209	1251	1163
VWLS R^2	0.50	0.51	0.32	0.60	0.22	0.62	0.32

a: $p<0.1$; b: $p<0.05$; c: $p<0.01$; d: $p<0.001$.

Note: Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) estimated by a multiplicative heteroscedastic regression.

Table B41: Effect of political sophistication and of the Index of Predisposition Strength on the stability of issue positions in Switzerland, second to third panel wave, 1999

	Asylum policy	Working time	VAT	Maternity insurance	Deficit reduction	European Union	Bilateral agreements
Mean							
Issue position $_{t-1}$	0.68^d	0.72^d	0.55^d	0.77^d	0.54^d	0.80^d	0.60^d
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Political sophistication	-0.01^a	0.00	0.03^d	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.02^c
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
IPS	–0.03	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Issue position $_{t-1}$*Soph.	0.06^c	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.08^c	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Issue position $_{t-1}$*IPS	0.03	0.10^a	0.14^b	–0.06	–0.01	–0.02	0.11
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Constant	0.01^a	-0.03^d	0.01	0.01^a	0.00	-0.02^c	0.01^b
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Log Var							
Political sophistication	-0.15^d	-0.14^c	-0.09^b	–0.03	-0.08^b	-0.15^d	-0.12^c
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
IPS	0.17	0.15	0.31^b	0.24^a	0.20	0.01	0.13
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Constant	-2.97^d	-3.07^d	-2.96^d	-3.05^d	-3.04^d	-3.22^d	-3.38^d
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
N	1251	1266	1231	1242	1209	1251	1163
VWLS R^2	0.52	0.54	0.35	0.63	0.28	0.63	0.40

a: $p<0.1$; b: $p<0.05$; c: $p<0.01$; d: $p<0.001$.

Note: Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) estimated by a multiplicative heteroscedastic regression.

Table B42: Effect of political sophistication and of the Index of Predisposition Strength on the stability of the sympathies for politicians in Switzerland, first to second panel wave, 1999

	R. Dreifuss	R. Metzler	F. Steinegger	C. Blocher
Mean				
Sympathy $_{t-1}$	0.80^d	0.73^d	0.67^d	0.84^d
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Political sophistication	0.00	–0.01	0.00	$–0.01^a$
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
IPS	–0.01	$–0.03^a$	0.01	–0.02
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Sympathy $_{t-1}$ × Soph.	0.03^a	0.02	0.02	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Sympathy $_{t-1}$ × IPS	0.09^a	0.16^c	0.16^b	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.04)
Constant	0.01^b	0.01	0.02^d	–0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Log Var				
Political sophistication	$–0.07^a$	$–0.10^b$	0.00	$–0.24^d$
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
IPS	$–0.39^c$	$–0.23^a$	0.02	–0.14
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.12)
Constant	$–3.59^d$	$–3.56^d$	$–3.65^d$	$–3.58^d$
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
N	1314	1218	1025	1291
VWLS R^2	0.67	0.57	0.48	0.76

a: $p<0.1$; b: $p<0.05$; c: $p<0.01$; d: $p<0.001$.
Note: Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) estimated by a multiplicative heteroscedastic regression.

Table B43: Effect of political sophistication and of the Index of Predisposition Strength on the stability of the sympathies for politicians in Switzerland, second to third panel wave, 1999

	R. Dreifuss	R. Metzler	F. Steinegger	C. Blocher
Mean				
Sympathy $_{t-1}$	0.79^d	0.75^d	0.62^d	0.88^d
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Political sophistication	0.00	0.00	0.01^b	–0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
IPS	0.01	0.00	–0.01	$–0.04^b$
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Sympathy $_{t-1}$ × Soph.	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Sympathy $_{t-1}$ × IPS	0.06	0.03	0.05	0.00
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.04)
Constant	0.02^d	0.01^a	0.07^d	0.03^d
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Log Var				
Political sophistication	$–0.26^d$	–0.05	$–0.19^d$	$–0.14^d$
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
IPS	0.06	0.55^d	0.37^c	–0.05
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.12)
Constant	$–3.73^d$	$–3.91^d$	$–3.71^d$	$–3.52^d$
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
N	1314	1218	1025	1291
VWLS R^2	0.69	0.65	0.46	0.76

a: $p<0.1$; b: $p<0.05$; c: $p<0.01$; d: $p<0.001$.
Note: Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) estimated by a multiplicative heteroscedastic regression.

Table B44: Effect of precampaign attitudes and of attitude changes on voters' choices among political novices in Switzerland, 1999

	Center		Liberal Right		Conservative Right	
	Coef.	Std. err.	Coef.	Std. err.	Coef.	Std. err.
Left-right position	6.77[c]	2.07	8.75[d]	2.13	8.18[d]	2.08
Party identification Left	–5.32[a]	2.72	–119.26	.	–1.42	1.56
Party identification Center	3.59[b]	1.46	–109.83	.	0.24	1.66
Party identification Lib. Right	55.87	.	60.83[d]	1.70	56.29[d]	2.10
Party identification Cons. Right	–1.31	2.76	–116.43	.	–0.51	2.31
Asylum policy t0	1.39	1.23	–0.33	1.25	0.36	1.36
Δ asylum policy	1.61	1.30	1.17	1.36	0.75	1.42
Working time t0	0.62	1.13	0.02	1.11	–1.76	1.12
Δ working time	0.31	1.21	0.72	1.18	–0.09	1.23
VAT t0	–2.86[b]	1.32	–0.24	1.22	–0.22	1.31
Δ VAT	–2.44[a]	1.36	–1.04	1.32	0.22	1.30
Maternity insurance t0	0.70	1.04	–0.27	1.02	0.63	1.11
Δ maternity insurance	0.37	1.16	–0.12	1.10	0.61	1.19
Deficit reduction t0	–0.36	1.45	–0.94	1.44	0.80	1.49
Δ deficit reduction	1.61	1.25	0.34	1.33	1.39	1.34
European Union t0	–0.33	1.29	–0.51	1.30	–2.06	1.27
Δ European Union	–0.26	1.43	–1.58	1.40	–4.76[d]	1.38
Bilateral agreements t0	1.71	1.68	2.06	1.77	1.01	1.78
Δ bilateral agreements	–0.75	1.42	0.67	1.45	2.35	1.50
Sympathy Dreifuss t0	–5.43[c]	1.75	–6.30[d]	1.75	–4.99[c]	1.75
Δ sympathy Dreifuss	–1.44	1.86	–3.58[b]	1.81	–1.48	1.85
Sympathy Metzler t0	7.14[d]	1.88	1.20	1.68	0.07	1.73
Δ sympathy Metzler	4.97[b]	2.14	3.27	1.99	3.28	2.09
Sympathy Steinegger t0	3.45[a]	1.78	6.03[c]	1.87	0.18	1.76
Δ sympathy Steinegger	3.41[a]	1.85	3.96[b]	1.84	–2.71	1.76
Sympathy Blocher t0	–0.52	1.25	1.35	1.25	6.76[d]	1.40
Δ sympathy Blocher	–1.38	1.39	–0.87	1.45	3.28[b]	1.42
Geneva	0.89	0.92	0.61	0.93	0.78	1.00
Zurich	–1.30[b]	0.60	–0.77	0.59	0.15	0.62
Constant	–8.34[d]	2.50	–5.34[b]	2.27	–3.59	2.34
N			394			
Log likelihood			–220.4			
McFadden's R^2			0.59			

a: p<0.1; b: p<0.05; c: p<0.01; d: p<0.001.

Note: Coefficients and standard errors estimated by a multinomial logistic regression. The base outcome includes respondents who voted for a Left party.

Table B45: Effect of precampaign attitudes and of attitude changes on voters' choices among political experts in Switzerland, 1999

	Center		Liberal Right		Conservative Right	
	Coef.	Std. err.	Coef.	Std. err.	Coef.	Std. err.
Left-right position	4.10[a]	2.29	6.95[c]	2.26	5.69[b]	2.80
Party identification Left	−114.88	.	−3.67[a]	1.95	−113.39	.
Party identification Center	6.09[d]	1.51	−2.49	2.75	0.63	2.47
Party identification Lib. Right	−2.43	2.20	2.47[a]	1.48	−1.53	1.81
Party identification Cons. Right	−1.87	3.93	−117.87	.	0.51	3.31
Asylum policy t0	−1.12	1.34	−0.03	1.33	1.55	2.10
Δ asylum policy	−2.14	1.32	−0.32	1.44	−1.34	1.92
Working time t0	−1.15	1.17	−2.47[b]	1.11	−1.62	1.48
Δ working time	−0.51	1.54	0.33	1.55	0.89	1.86
VAT t0	0.59	1.35	−0.98	1.28	−1.34	1.64
Δ VAT	1.38	1.44	0.98	1.32	−1.19	1.91
Maternity insurance t0	−0.47	1.31	−3.14[b]	1.26	−3.99[b]	1.87
Δ maternity insurance	−2.20[a]	1.31	−1.97	1.21	−4.94[c]	1.73
Deficit reduction t0	1.11	1.53	2.86[a]	1.48	2.18	1.91
Δ deficit reduction	1.07	1.30	2.64[b]	1.28	2.25	1.70
European Union t0	0.50	1.44	0.34	1.45	1.00	1.89
Δ European Union	−0.02	1.66	2.33	1.61	1.07	2.12
Bilateral agreements t0	−5.34[b]	2.13	0.46	2.12	0.27	2.36
Δ bilateral agreements	−2.96	1.90	0.65	1.89	−0.16	2.11
Sympathy Dreifuss t0	−2.80	1.78	−4.87[c]	1.70	−2.65	2.04
Δ sympathy Dreifuss	0.13	2.07	−2.56	1.94	−1.47	2.26
Sympathy Metzler t0	4.08[b]	1.91	0.93	1.77	2.24	2.43
Δ sympathy Metzler	2.98	2.02	−0.10	2.04	2.08	2.60
Sympathy Steinegger t0	2.32	2.05	5.70[b]	2.30	0.01	2.71
Δ sympathy Steinegger	−1.36	1.93	2.97	2.17	−4.46	3.14
Sympathy Blocher t0	−0.40	1.77	−3.69[b]	1.76	7.01[c]	2.26
Δ sympathy Blocher	1.21	1.72	1.72	1.86	5.61[c]	2.04
Geneva	−1.32	1.23	0.68	1.07	−2.46	2.13
Zurich	−1.54[b]	0.62	−0.73	0.65	−0.85	0.82
Constant	0.69	2.61	−2.82	2.77	−5.50	3.48
N			384			
Log likelihood			−151.2			
McFadden's R^2			0.71			

a: $p<0.1$; b: $p<0.05$; c: $p<0.01$; d: $p<0.001$.

Note: Coefficients and standard errors estimated by a multinomial logistic regression. The base outcome includes respondents who voted for a Left party.

Table B46: Effect of respondents' attitudes on voting intentions or choices in Germany, 1972

	Wave 1		Wave 2		Wave 3	
	Coef.	Std. err.	Coef.	Std. err.	Coef.	Std. err.
Party identification government	3.67[d]	0.72	3.73[d]	0.68	2.87[d]	0.55
Party identification opposition	–9.59[d]	1.52	–4.72[d]	0.90	–5.14[d]	0.86
Economic situation	0.32	0.90	0.81	0.94	0.93	0.95
Sympathy CDU candidate	–4.45[d]	0.71	–4.46[d]	0.74	–2.62[d]	0.56
Sympathy SPD candidate	4.59[d]	0.76	4.44[d]	0.77	4.26[d]	0.80
Constant	–0.12	0.83	–0.62	0.83	–1.89[b]	0.84
N	914		914		914	
Log likelihood	–128.7		–149.9		–181.3	
McFadden's R^2	0.78		0.75		0.70	

a: p<0.1; b: p<0.05; c: p<0.01; d: p<0.001.
Note: Coefficients and standard errors estimated by logit regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy taking the value 1 for supporters of a partying government, and the value 0 for supporters of an opposition party.

Table B47: Effect of respondents' attitudes on voting intentions or choices in Germany, 1976

	Wave 1		Wave 2		Wave 3	
	Coef.	Std. err.	Coef.	Std. err.	Coef.	Std. err.
Left-right position	–3.24[c]	1.03	–2.80[c]	1.08	–5.47[d]	1.51
Party identification government	4.13[d]	0.75	4.76[d]	0.88	5.72[d]	0.97
Party identification opposition	–4.87[d]	0.99	–7.01[d]	1.34	–4.93[d]	1.39
Economic situation	0.62	0.96	1.94[a]	1.17	1.81	1.63
Sympathy CDU candidate	–4.34[d]	0.93	–4.41[d]	1.13	–6.74[d]	1.28
Sympathy SPD candidate	4.65[d]	0.91	3.17[d]	0.89	4.98[d]	1.33
Constant	0.98	1.04	1.18	1.31	2.65	1.68
N	833		833		833	
Log likelihood	–144.8		–110.6		–76.7	
McFadden's R^2	0.75		0.81		0.87	

a: p<0.1; b: p<0.05; c: p<0.01; d: p<0.001.
Note: Coefficients and standard errors estimated by logit regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy taking the value 1 for supporters of a partying government, and the value 0 for supporters of an opposition party.

Table B48: Effect of respondents' attitudes on voting intentions or choices in Germany, 1983

	Wave 1		Wave 2		Wave 3	
	Coef.	Std. err.	Coef.	Std. err.	Coef.	Std. err.
Left-right position	5.59[d]	0.97	6.76[d]	1.22	5.67[d]	1.15
Party identification government	6.28[d]	1.13	4.41[d]	1.19	7.85[d]	1.63
Party identification opposition	−5.55[d]	0.94	−7.25[d]	1.33	−3.47[d]	0.77
Economic situation	−0.52	0.85	0.25	1.09	−0.72	1.11
Sympathy CDU candidate	5.44[d]	0.74	4.08[d]	0.91	5.23[d]	0.81
Sympathy SPD candidate	−3.89[d]	0.86	−6.81[d]	1.00	−4.32[d]	0.93
Constant	−3.68[d]	0.93	−1.54	0.99	−3.37[c]	1.19
N	808		808		808	
Log likelihood	−136.8		−102.5		−115.8	
McFadden's R^2	0.75		0.82		0.79	

a: $p<0.1$; b: $p<0.05$; c: $p<0.01$; d: $p<0.001$.
Note: Coefficients and standard errors estimated by logit regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy taking the value 1 for supporters of a partying government, and the value 0 for supporters of an opposition party.

Table B49: Effect of respondents' attitudes on voting intentions or choices in Germany, 1987

	Wave 1		Wave 2		Wave 3	
	Coef.	Std. err.	Coef.	Std. err.	Coef.	Std. err.
Left-right position	4.24[d]	0.87	3.30[d]	0.88	2.78[d]	0.84
Party identification government	7.22[d]	1.31	6.76[d]	1.45	9.51[d]	1.60
Party identification opposition	−5.03[d]	0.84	−6.37[d]	0.99	−5.57[d]	0.80
Economic situation	1.51[a]	0.90	2.25[b]	0.99	3.09[c]	1.00
Sympathy CDU candidate	4.37[d]	0.69	4.19[d]	0.67	2.57[d]	0.61
Sympathy SPD candidate	−4.56[d]	0.78	−3.60[d]	0.68	−2.71[d]	0.68
Constant	−2.92[d]	0.86	−3.13[d]	0.94	−3.15[d]	0.96
N	1027		1027		1027	
Log likelihood	−145.7		−150.1		−152.7	
McFadden's R^2	0.80		0.79		0.79	

a: $p<0.1$; b: $p<0.05$; c: $p<0.01$; d: $p<0.001$.
Note: Coefficients and standard errors estimated by logit regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy taking the value 1 for supporters of a partying government, and the value 0 for supporters of an opposition party.

Table B50: Effect of respondents' attitudes on voting intentions or choices in Germany, 1990

	Wave 1		Wave 2		Wave 3	
	Coef.	Std. err.	Coef.	Std. err.	Coef.	Std. err.
Left-right position	3.19[a]	1.79	4.12[b]	1.69	3.18[d]	0.93
Party identification government	7.78[d]	1.71	8.09[d]	2.21	5.00[d]	0.97
Party identification opposition	–5.64[d]	1.45	–7.70[d]	1.49	–3.81[d]	0.74
Economic situation	1.01	1.49	4.40[c]	1.65	0.28	0.73
Sympathy CDU candidate	7.08[d]	1.54	8.05[d]	1.87	1.80[b]	0.73
Sympathy SPD candidate	–6.37[d]	1.42	–6.18[d]	1.32	–2.64[d]	0.73
Constant	–3.13[a]	1.83	–6.66[c]	2.10	–1.39	1.09
N	582		582		582	
Log likelihood	–56.2		–50.0		–122.5	
McFadden's R^2	0.86		0.88		0.69	

a: p<0.1; b: p<0.05; c: p<0.01; d: p<0.001.
Note: Coefficients and standard errors estimated by logit regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy taking the value 1 for supporters of a partying government, and the value 0 for supporters of an opposition party.

Table B51: Effect of respondents' attitudes on voting intentions in Switzerland, first wave, 1999

	Center		Liberal Right		Conservative Right	
	Coef.	Std. err.	Coef.	Std. err.	Coef.	Std. err.
Tightening asylum policy	–0.14	0.59	0.18	0.64	0.88	0.83
Reduction working time	–1.10[b]	0.54	–2.74[d]	0.55	–1.61[b]	0.64
Increase VAT	–1.47[b]	0.62	–1.49[b]	0.62	–0.71	0.73
Maternity insurance	–0.82	0.53	–1.89[d]	0.53	–2.07[c]	0.68
Deficit reduction	0.18	0.66	0.90	0.69	–0.29	0.82
European Union	0.17	0.56	0.98	0.61	–1.01	0.69
Bilateral Agreements	–0.18	0.76	0.76	0.83	0.79	0.87
Sympathy for R. Dreifuss	–2.37[c]	0.75	–2.70[d]	0.77	–2.77[c]	0.86
Sympathy for R. Metzler	7.69[d]	0.96	1.63[a]	0.86	3.13[c]	1.02
Sympathy for F. Steinegger	0.03	0.77	3.93[d]	0.86	1.06	0.96
Sympathy for C. Blocher	0.53	0.66	–0.09	0.68	5.16[c]	0.83
Constant	–2.48[b]	1.16	–0.77	1.16	–2.60[a]	1.40
N			547			
Log likelihood			–447.6			
McFadden's R^2			0.41			

a: p<0.1; b: p<0.05; c: p<0.01; d: p<0.001.
Note: Coefficients and standard errors estimated by a multinomial logistic regression. The base outcome includes respondents who voted for a Left party.

Table B52: Effect of respondents' attitudes on voting intentions in Switzerland, second wave, 1999

	Center		Liberal Right		Conservative Right	
	Coef.	Std. err.	Coef.	Std. err.	Coef.	Std. err.
Tightening asylum policy	0.16	0.58	–0.44	0.62	1.15	0.85
Reduction working time	–0.79	0.57	–2.29[d]	0.59	–1.43[b]	0.69
Increase VAT	–0.73	0.61	–1.30[b]	0.66	–0.60	0.79
Maternity insurance	–0.22	0.56	–1.68[c]	0.60	–2.26[c]	0.76
Deficit reduction	2.34[d]	0.76	2.60[d]	0.78	3.74[d]	0.90
European Union	–1.16[a]	0.65	0.13	0.70	–1.33[a]	0.80
Bilateral Agreements	0.40	0.84	2.30[c]	0.89	1.65	1.01
Sympathy for R. Dreifuss	–3.19[d]	0.89	–4.58[d]	0.91	–4.48[d]	1.04
Sympathy for R. Metzler	7.30[d]	0.97	2.85[c]	0.94	2.44[b]	1.13
Sympathy for F. Steinegger	0.64	0.82	3.58[d]	0.91	0.24	1.10
Sympathy for C. Blocher	0.34	0.68	0.24	0.71	5.60[d]	0.87
Constant	–3.89[c]	1.20	–2.12[a]	1.23	–3.79[b]	1.49
N			547			
Log likelihood			–422.0			
McFadden's R^2			0.44			

a: p<0.1; b: p<0.05; c: p<0.01; d: p<0.001.
Note: Coefficients and standard errors estimated by a multinomial logistic regression. The base outcome includes respondents who voted for a Left party.

Table B53: Effect of respondents' attitudes on voting choices in Switzerland, third wave, 1999

	Center		Liberal Right		Conservative Right	
	Coef.	Std. err.	Coef.	Std. err.	Coef.	Std. err.
Tightening asylum policy	0.43	0.63	0.03	0.68	0.91	0.91
Reduction working time	–1.33[b]	0.57	–2.04[d]	0.60	–1.31[a]	0.77
Increase VAT	–0.37	0.67	–0.02	0.69	0.31	0.80
Maternity insurance	–0.05	0.57	–1.77[c]	0.60	–2.27[c]	0.78
Deficit reduction	0.18	0.70	1.59[b]	0.75	1.46	0.90
European Union	–0.44	0.65	0.28	0.71	–0.76	0.79
Bilateral Agreements	0.64	0.80	2.23[b]	0.90	2.67[c]	1.00
Sympathy for R. Dreifuss	–4.23[d]	0.97	–5.17[d]	1.00	–4.88[d]	1.12
Sympathy for R. Metzler	6.52[d]	1.00	0.97	0.92	2.92[b]	1.19
Sympathy for F. Steinegger	2.42[c]	0.91	5.87[d]	1.11	–1.16	1.24
Sympathy for C. Blocher	0.75	0.74	1.62[b]	0.79	7.57[d]	1.02
Constant	–3.63[d]	1.23	–3.20[b]	1.33	–3.58[b]	1.59
N			547			
Log likelihood			–415.2			
McFadden's R^2			0.45			

a: p<0.1; b: p<0.05; c: p<0.01; d: p<0.001.
Note: Coefficients and standard errors estimated by a multinomial logistic regression. The base outcome includes respondents who voted for a Left party.

Operationalization

Measuring social class

The logic underlying the construction of our class schema was presented in chapter four. When we have sufficient data, we construct a modified version of the Goldthorpe schema, by separating the service class into three groups. This, however, is only possible in four Swiss elections (1975, 1995, 1999, and 2003). This class schema is based on ISCO codes, and uses also information on voters' employment status. The construction of this detailed class schema is documented in tables B54 (1988 ISCO codes) and B55 (1968 ISCO codes). In the remaining surveys (1971, 1979, 1987, and 1991 in Switzerland, as well as all German surveys), we use a simpler class schema, were only six categories are distinguished. The construction of this variable is detailed in tables B56 (Switzerland) and B57 (Germany).

Table B54: Construction of the class schema, 1988 ISCO codes

	Employees	Senior employees	Self-employed
Major group 1: legislators, senior officials and managers			
1221, 1311	Farmers	Farmers	Farmers
all other codes	Managers	Managers	Managers
Major group 2: Professionals			
2100–2149, 2210–2213, 2410, 2411, 2419, 2441	Experts	Experts	Experts
2220–2359, 2412, 2430–2440, 2442–2460	Social-cultural specialists	Social-cultural specialists	Social-cultural specialists
2420–2429	Managers	Managers	Managers
Major group 3: Technicians and associate professionals			
3100–3213	Experts	Experts	Experts
3220–3340, 3460–3480	Social-cultural specialists	Social-cultural specialists	Social-cultural specialists
3400–3439	Managers	Managers	Small self-employed
3440–3450	Managers	Managers	Managers
Major group 4: Clerks			
4142	Unskilled workers	Unskilled workers	Small self-employed
all other codes	Routine nonmanual workers	Managers	Small self-employed
Major group 5: Service workers and shop and market sales workers			
5110–5113, 5120, 5150, 5200–5230	Routine nonmanual workers	Managers	Small self-employed
5121	Managers	Managers	Small self-employed
5122, 5140, 5141, 5143, 5161, 5162	Skilled workers	Skilled workers	Small self-employed
5123, 5130, 5132, 5139, 5142, 5149, 5160, 5163, 5169	Unskilled workers	Unskilled workers	Small self-employed
5131, 5133	Routine nonmanual workers	Social-cultural specialists	Small self-employed

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Table B54 (*continued*)

	Employees	Senior employees	Self-employed
Major group 6: Skilled agricultural and fishery workers			
6200, 6210	Farmers	Farmers	Farmers
all other codes	Unskilled workers	Unskilled workers	Farmers
Major group 7: Craft and related trade workers			
7121–7123, 7131, 7135, 7142, 7143, 7320–7322, 7330–7332, 7421, 7424, 7431, 7432	Unskilled workers	Unskilled workers	Small self-employed
all other codes	Skilled workers	Skilled workers	Small self-employed
Major group 8: Plant and machine operators and assemblers			
8000, 8100, 8130, 8131, 8139, 8140–8143, 8200, 8212, 8220–8224, 8229, 8230–8232, 8240, 8250–8253, 8260–8266, 8269, 8270–8279, 8280–8286, 8290, 8300, 8310, 8312, 8320–8324, 8330, 8334, 8340	Unskilled workers	Unskilled workers	Small self-employed
8110–8113, 8120–8124, 8150–8155, 8159, 8160–8163, 8170–8172, 8210, 8211, 8311, 8332, 8333	Skilled workers	Skilled workers	Small self-employed
8331	Unskilled workers	Unskilled workers	Farmers
Major group 9: Elementary occupations			
9000 9120 9130–9133 9140–9142 9150–9153 9160–9162, 9200	Unskilled workers	Unskilled workers	Small self-employed
9100, 9110–9113	Routine nonmanual workers	Managers	Routine nonmanual workers
9210–9213	Unskilled workers	Unskilled workers	Farmers
9300 9310–9313 9320–9322 9330–9333	Unskilled workers	Unskilled workers	Farmers
Major group 0: Armed forces			
110	Managers		

Table B55: Construction of the class schema, 1968 ISCO codes

	Employees	Senior employees	Self-employed
Major group 0/1: Professional, technical and related workers			
10–54, 77, 80–110, 163	Experts	Experts	Experts
60–76, 79, 130–162, 170–173, 175–195	Social-cultural specialists	Social-cultural specialists	Social-cultural specialists
199	Managers	Managers	Small self-employed
Major group 2: Administrative and managerial workers			
200–219	Managers	Managers	Managers
Major group 3: Clerical and related workers			
300–310	Managers	Managers	Managers
320–322, 331, 339, 341, 350, 359, 360, 380–399	Routine nonmanual workers	Managers	Small self-employed
330, 351, 352	Managers	Managers	Small self-employed
340, 342	Experts	Experts	Experts
370	Unskilled workers	Unskilled workers	Small self-employed
Major group 4: Sales workers			
400–421	Managers	Managers	Managers
422–443	Managers	Managers	Small self-employed
450, 451, 490	Routine nonmanual workers	Managers	Small self-employed
452	Routine nonmanual workers	Managers	Routine nonmanual workers
Major group 5: Service workers			
500, 510	Managers	Managers	Managers
520	Managers	Managers	Small self-employed
530, 590, 591, 599	Routine nonmanual workers	Managers	Small self-employed
531, 570, 581, 582, 592	Skilled workers	Skilled workers	Small self-employed
532–560, 580, 589	Unskilled workers	Unskilled workers	Small self-employed

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Table B55 (*continued*)

	Employees	Senior employees	Self-employed
Major group 6: Agriculture, animal husbandry and forestry workers, fishermen and hunters			
600	Farmers	Farmers	Farmers
610–631, 640–649	Unskilled workers	Unskilled workers	Farmers
632	Unskilled workers	Unskilled workers	Small self-employed
Major group 7/8/9: Production and related workers, transport equipment operators and labourers			
700–727, 729, 740–749, 760–762, 773, 776, 790–796, 800–811, 819–852, 854–859, 870–880, 894, 895, 920, 921, 923–926, 929–931, 940–941, 950, 954–956, 959–969, 972–974, 982, 983	Skilled workers	Skilled workers	Small self-employed
728, 730–734, 750–759, 770–772, 774, 775, 777–789, 799, 812, 853, 890–893, 899–910, 922, 927, 939, 942–949, 951–953, 957, 970, 971, 979–981, 984–989	Unskilled workers	Unskilled workers	Small self-employed
860–862	Experts	Experts	Experts
990, 999	Unskilled workers	Unskilled workers	Unskilled workers

Table B56: Construction of the class schema, Switzerland, 1971, 1979, 1987, and 1991

	1971	1979	1987	1991
Farmers	Agriculteur, exploitant	Landwirt	Landwirte	Landwirte
Other self-employed	Propriétaire PME, artisan indépendant; propriétaire grande entreprise; profession libérale	Selbständiger Gewerbetreibender; Unternehmer; Freie Berufe	Selbständiger Geschäftsinhaber; selbständiger Gewerbetreibender; Freie Berufe	Selbständige
Semiskilled and unskilled workers	Ouvrier non qualifié; ouvrier semi-qualifié; ouvrier agricole	Hilfsarbeiter; angelernter Arbeiter; Landarbeiter	Ungelernte Arbeiter	Arbeiter
Skilled workers and foremen	Ouvrier qualifié; contre-maître	Gelernter Arbeiter; Vorarbeiter	Facharbeiter	—
Routine nonmanual workers	Cadre inférieur; fonctionnaire de rang inférieur	Einfacher Angestellter; einfacher Beamter	Einfache Angestellte; einfache Beamte	Untere Angestellte
Service class employees	Cadre moyen; cadre supérieur; fonctionnaire de rang moyen; haut fonctionnaire	Mittlerer Angestellter; leitender Angestellter; mittlerer Beamter; leitender Beamter	Mittlere Angestellte; leitende Angestellte; mittlere Beamte; leitende Beamte	Mittlere Angestellte

Table B57: Construction of the class schema, Germany

	1969–1987, 1998, 2002	1990	1994
Unskilled workers	Angelernte Arbeiter, ungelernte Arbeiter, landwirtschaftliche Arbeiter	Angelernte Arbeiter, ungelernte Arbeiter, Landarbeiter	Angelernte/ungelernte Arbeiter
Skilled workers	Facharbeiter, sehr qualifizierte Facharbeiter	Facharbeiter	Industrie- und Werkmeister im Angestelltenverhältnis, gelernte und Facharbeiter, Vorarbeiter und Kolonnenführer/Brigadier, Meister/Poliere
Routine nonmanual employees	Ausführende Angestellte, einfache Angestellte, Beamte des einfachen Dienstes	Angestellte mit einfacher Tätigkeit, Beamte im einfachen Dienst, Mannschaftsdientsgrad, Unteroffiziere	Beamte im einfachen Dienst; Angestellte mit einfacher Tätigkeit;
Service class	Qualifizierte Angestellte, Leitende Angestellte, mittlere Angestellte, wissenschaftliche Angestellte, Beamte des mittleren Dienstes, Beamte des gehobenen Dienstes, Beamte des höheren Dienstes	Angestellte mit gehobener Tätigkeit, Angestellte mit leitender Tätigkeit, Beamte im mittleren Dienst, Beamte im gehobenen Dienst, Beamte im höheren Dienst, Richter, Offiziere	Beamte im mittleren Dienst; Beamte im gehobenen Dienst; Beamte im höheren Dienst; Angestellte, die schwierige Aufgaben nach allgemeiner Anweisung selbständig erledigen; Angestellte, die selbständig Leistungen in verantwortungsvoller Tätigkeit erbringen oder begrenzte Verantwortung für die Tätigkeit anderer übernehmen; Angestellte mit umfassenden Führungsaufgaben und Entscheidungsbefugnissen
Self-employed	Freie Berufe, selbständige Akademiker, kleinere Selbständige, grössere Selbständige, mittlere Selbständige, Inhaber Grossunternehmen	Selbständige	Akademische freie Berufe, Selbständige
Farmers	Kleine Landwirte, mittlere Landwirte, grosse Landwirte	Selbständige Landwirte	Selbständige in Landwirtschaft

Education

In Switzerland, the educational categories used in the different original surveys varied substantially. At one extreme, in the 1999 and 2003 studies, 13 different education levels were distinguished. By contrast, only five answer categories were proposed in 1987 or 1991. In order to get a single variable for all datasets, we distinguish only three levels of education. The middle category corresponds to a vocational education, and the other categories comprise all respondents with a lower or a higher education, respectively. Table B58 indicates for each survey how the original answer categories were recoded.

In Germany, educational categories were more homogeneous. A five-category variable can be constructed for all surveys, with the following groups: *Volks/Hauptschule ohne Lehre*, *Volks/Hauptschule mit Lehre*, *Mittlere Reife*, *Abitur*, *Abgeschlossenes Studium*. The operationalization of the variable is detailed in table B59.

Table B58: Coding of voters' educational level, Switzerland

	Education level		
	Low	Middle	High
1971	école primaire	secondaire inférieur	secondaire, sans maturité; université, sans licence; université, avec licence
1975	sans scolarité; primaire, non terminé; primaire	apprentissage; secondaire inférieur	secondaire, sans maturité; école technique; maturité; école normale; université, sans licence; université, avec licence
1979	Oberschule; Realschule; Sekundarschule	Berufsschule	Fachschule (Technikum,...); Gymnasium ohne Matura; Gymnasium mit Matura; Universität ohne Abschluss; Universität mit Abschluss
1987	Primarschule; Sekundarschule	Berufsschule	Gymnasium; Universität
1991	Primarschule; Sekundar-, Bezirk-, Realschule	Berufsschule	Gymnasium/Technikum; Universität
1995	école obligatoire; formation professionnelle élémentaire	apprentissage	diplôme, école de culture générale; maturité; formation professionnelle supérieure; école professionnelle supérieure, école technique; université
1999, 2003	no school education; primary school; secondary school; basic vocational training	vocational training	diploma school; trading school; secondary school vocational diploma; high school; higher vocational education; higher vocational education with master diploma; higher vocational college; university

Table B59: Coding of voters' educational level, Germany

	Volks/Hauptschule ohne Lehre	Volks/Hauptschule mit Lehre	Mittlere Reife	Abitur	Abgeschlossenes Studium
1969	Volksschule (und Berfschule) ohne abgeschlossene Lehre / Berufsausbildung	Volksschule mit abgeschlossener Lehre / Berufsausbildung; Handelsschule; Höhere Schule bis Obertertia	Mittlere Reife; Höhere Schule ohne Abitur (Länger als Untersekunda)	Höhere Fachschule mit Abschluss; Abitur	Hochschule / Universität ohne Abschluss; Hochschule / Universität mit Abschluss
1972	Id.	Volksschule mit abgeschlossener Lehre oder Berufsausbildung; Mittelschule ohne Abschluss / Mehrjährige Fachschule ohne Abschluss / Handelsschule ohne Abschluss; Höhere Schule bis Obertertia	Id.	Id.	Id.
1976, 1980, 1983, 1987	Haupt- / Volksschule / Berufsschule ohne abgeschlossene Lehre oder Berufsausbildung	Haupt- / Volksschule mit abgeschlossener Lehre oder Berufsausbildung; Mittelschule / Mehrjährige Fachschule / Handelsschule ohne Abschluss	Mittlere Reife; Fachschule / Handelsschule mit Abschluss; Höhere Schule ohne Abitur (Länger als Untersekunda, 10. Klasse)	Höhere Fachschule / Fachhochschule mit Abschluss; Abitur / Hochschulreife	Hochschule / Universität ohne Abschluss; Hochschule / Universität mit Abschluss
1990	Haupt- / Volks- / Berufsschulabschluß	Haupt- / Volks- / Berufsschulabschluß + abgeschlossene Berufsausbildung	Mittel- / Real- / Fach- / Handelsschulabschluß	Abitur / Hochschulreife / Fachhochschulreife; noch in der Schule	Abitur / Hochschulreife / Fachhochschulreife + Staatsexamen, Diplom oder ähnlicher Abschluß

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Table B59 (*continued*)

	Volks/Hauptschule ohne Lehre	Volks/Hauptschule mit Lehre	Mittlere Reife	Abitur	Abgeschlossenes Studium
1994	Kein Schulabschluss; Volks- / Hauptschulabschluss	Kein Schulabschluss; Volks- / Hauptschulabschluss + berufliche Ausbildung (Lehre oder Berufsfachschule)	Mittlere Reife / Realschulabschluss / Fachschulreife; Polytechnische Oberschule mit 10. Klasse Abschluss; noch in der Schule	Fachhochschulreife / Fachoberschule; Abiture / allgemeine Hochschulreife	Fachhochschulabschluss; Hochschulabschluss (mit oder ohne Diplom); Fachakademie / Meister- oder Technikerschule
1998, 2002	Schule beendet ohne Abschluss; Volks- / Hauptschule; noch Schüler, strebt Hauptschulabschluss an	Schule beendet ohne Abschluss; Volks- / Hauptschule + berufliche Lehre	Mittlere Reife; noch Schüler, strebt Mittlere Reife an	Abitur; noch Schüler, strebt Abitur / Fachabitur an	Abgeschlossenes Studium

Classification of Swiss political parties

When we analyze respondents' votes in Switzerland, we usually consider four groups of parties. The composition of these groups is indicated below (for the parties represented in both the German and French linguistic regions, we indicate both corresponding names. Otherwise, only the original party name is listed):

- Left: Sozialdemokratische Partei/Parti Socialiste (SP/PS), Grüne Partei/Parti Ecologiste (GPS/PES), Partei der Arbeit/Parti du Travail (PdA/PdT), SolidaritéS/Alliance de Gauche (AdG), Alternative Liste/Linkes Bündnis, Basta, Bunte Liste, Combat socialiste, Demokratisches Nidwalden, Die andere Schweiz/Alternative socialiste verte (DAS/ASV), Frauen macht Politik (Frap!), Freie Umweltliste, Glarner Umweltgruppen, Grünes Bündnis (GBS, former Grüne Alternative Schweiz), Grüne-freie Liste, Kritisches Forum, La Verda, Les VertEs et Solidarités, Mouvement écologiste, Ökoliberale Bewegung, Parti Libéral-Social, Parti Socialiste Autonome (PSA), Partito socialista unitario (PSU), Progressive Organisationen der Schweiz (POCH), Renaissance Suisse-Europe, Sozialistisch Grüne Alternative Zug (SGA), Verts alternatifs.

- Center: Christlischdemokratische Volkspartei/Parti Démocrate-Chrétien (CVP/PDC), Christlichsoziale Partei/Parti Chrétien-Social (CSP/PCS), Evangelische Volkspartei/Parti Evangélique Populaire (EVP/PEV), Landesring der Unabhängigen/Alliance des Indépendants (LdU/AdI), Parti Indépendant Chrétien-Social (PICS).

- Liberal Right: Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei/ Parti radical-démocratique (FDP/PRD), Liberale Partei/Parti libéral (LPS/PLS).

- Conservative Right: Schweizerische Volkspartei/Union démocratique du centre (SVP/UDC), Eidgenössisch-Demokratische Union/Union Démocratique Fédérale (EDU/UDF), Freiheitspartei/Parti de la Liberté (FPS/PdL former Autopartei/Parti des Automobilistes), Lega dei Ticinesi, Republikanische Bewegung/Mouvement républicain (Rep.), Schweizer Demokraten/Démocrates Suisses (SD/DS, former Nationale Aktion/Action nationale), Vigilance.