Individual and contextual variation in the impact of ideology and leader evaluations

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Paper prepared for the 2010 Conference of the Portuguese Political Science Association, Aveiro, March 4–6

Introduction[1]

This paper focuses on the impact of leader evaluations on voting choices, in the framework of spatial models. A variety of spatial models has been discussed and tested in the literature, that all emphasize the role of issues and ideological preferences in the explanation of voting choices. All of these models are based on the core assumption that the relative position of voters and parties in the political space is central to explain individual voting choices. These positions are typically defined using a left–right or liberal–conservative dimension. These models vary on aspects such as the way in which voters' and parties' positions are compared (e.g., Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989) or how party positions enter into the vote function (e.g., Adams et al. 2005; Kedar 2005).

Spatial models have been extended to include other factors, such as party identification (Erikson and Romero 1990; Adams 2001). This has allowed researchers to combine the findings from two different research traditions, rational-choice models (e.g., Downs 1957) and models emphasizing the role of traditional party loyalties (Campbell et al. 1960). Another important direction in which such models have been extended is by including 'valence' components, i.e., positive or negative evaluations of parties that cannot be explained by their issue positions (Schofield and Sened 2005, 2006), or parties' perceived competence (Green 2007).

Including leader evaluations in spatial models, by contrast, is not usual. These evaluations can however be thought of as reflecting a distance between a voter and a party. A positive evaluation of a party leader can be interpreted as an indicator of voter–party proximity on a leader evaluation scale – by analogy with a short voter–party distance on the ideological scale.

My general hypothesis is that there is a trade-off between issue or ideological voting, on the one hand, and voting based on leader evaluations. I would expect that some voters rely more strongly on ideological distances, others more on their evaluations of leaders. Similarly, I would also expect variation across contexts, with some conditions fostering strong ideological voting and weaker 'leader voting', and other contexts having the opposite effect. The main reason for expecting such a trade-off is that ideological voting should require more

[1] A previous version of this paper was presented at the 2009 ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshop, Lisbon, April 14–19. I would like to thank the participants in this workshop for their comments, in particular Marina Costa Lobo, John Curtice, and Anne Jadot. This research was supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation (Grant PZ00P1_121606).

information than an evaluation of parties based on their leaders. Evaluating candidates' traits, for instance, is cognitively less demanding as people are used to making such inferences in everyday life (Rahn et al. 1990). Evaluations of leaders may function as a heuristic device, allowing citizens to form a voting decision even with limited knowledge of the parties' policy positions.

In this paper, I test this idea of a trade-off between the two types of determinants of party preferences. I expect that the relative impact of ideology and leader evaluations depends on both individual and context-level factors. As far as voters' characteristics are concerned, I expect a high degree of political sophistication to reinforce the impact of ideology, compared to that of leader evaluations. At the contextual level, I test hypotheses about the effect of party system polarization, of party system fragmentation, and of the proportionality of the electoral system. These factors, I argue, lead parties to put more or less emphasis on issues and ideology during their campaign, and can thus increase or decrease the importance of ideological voting.

I test these hypotheses using data from the 2007 Swiss election study. This allows comparing the cantons, i.e., the electoral districts, which offer enough variation on the relevant context-level characteristics, while still being very similar on many aspects and thus reducing many of the difficulties linked with comparative electoral research.

In the next section, I present my hypotheses about the role of sophistication and of the electoral context in more detail. Section three presents the data and the model specification. This is followed by a presentation of the results in section four. The paper concludes with a summary of the main findings and a discussion of their implications.

Hypotheses

We know from previous research on elections and on opinion formation that citizens differ in the degree to which they rely on ideological and abstract criteria to evaluate issues or political actors (e.g., Sniderman et al. 1991). An important characteristic of voters, in this respect, is their degree of 'political sophistication' or 'political expertise'. In politics like in other domains, expertise not only implies a larger amount of knowledge on a given topic, but also a better organization of that information and a more systematic processing of new information (Fiske et al. 1983; McGraw and Pinney 1990; Zaller 1992). Political sophistication is a central

factor in explaining how citizens process political information and how they form opinions or make decisions in political matters. Citizens with a high degree of political sophistication are typically more likely to rely on issues and ideological criteria, while 'political novices' are more prone to rely on heuristics or 'cognitive shortcuts'. My first hypothesis is thus that the impact of ideological distances increases with voters' level of political knowledge. The impact of leader evaluations, if they function as heuristic, should by contrast decrease with the level of sophistication. This hypothesis is more tentative as less is known about the role of such evaluations in the voting-decision process. At the least, I would however expect that the *relative* impact of leader evaluations, compared to that of ideology, is negatively related to political expertise.

There are several reasons why I also expect the strength of ideological and of leader voting to be conditioned by *contextual characteristics*. Previous research has shown that the impact of values and of ideology is stronger in polarized party systems (van der Eijk et al. 2005; Knutsen and Kumlin 2005; Lachat 2008; Kroh 2009). In such party systems, voters are more often confronted with ideological statements, making ideological criteria both more easily available and easier to use. A polarized context may also lead to the perception that the stakes of the election are higher. Citizens may thus consider their voting decision as more important and rely less strongly on heuristics (Maheswaran and Chaiken 1991; Lachat and Sciarini 2002; Lachat 2007). Following on the idea of a trade-off between ideological and leader voting, I would expect also the relative impact of leader voting to decrease as the party system becomes more polarized.

The expected impact of polarization, as explained above, is a consequence of party campaign strategies. When parties clearly differ from one another in ideological terms, they have an incentive to emphasize these differences during their electoral campaign. Yet, other contextual characteristics may play a similar role. I will focus here on two additional aspects: the fragmentation of the party system, and the degree of proportionality of the electoral system. These three aspects can be grouped under a more general concept: the *competitiveness* of the electoral context. Elections are more competitive when the party system is fragmented and polarized, and when the electoral system is more proportional. It corresponds to a situation where voters are faced with a variety of parties, advocating different political positions, and where the hurdles for entry into parliament are relatively low. Fragmentation means that parties are smaller on average. Their electorate is likely to be more homogeneous, to have more in common in terms of ideological preferences. Similarly to the effect of polarization, this should strengthen the impact of ideological preferences on voting

propensities. The proportionality of the electoral system, finally, may also influence party strategies. In less proportional elections, a party needs to mobilize a larger share of the electorate, possibly with more diverse issue preferences. This may incite parties to put less emphasis on concrete policy positions and to focus more strongly on valence issues (Norris 2004; Green and Hobolt 2006). I would thus expect that on all three aspects, more competitive elections mean a stronger impact of ideological voting, and a comparatively weaker influence of leader evaluations.

Data and methods

To analyze how ideological and leader voting varies across voters and contexts, I rely on data from the 2007 Swiss election study.[2] Comparing electoral districts in a single election, rather than voters in different polities, avoids several sources of variation that would make it difficult to capture context effects. The parties and their leaders, for instance, are the same in all 26 cantons. Many other aspects of the political system are identical across electoral districts. At the same time, however, the context factors on which this study concentrates do vary across the cantons. While the election takes place under a PR system, the district magnitude ranges from 1 (de facto majoritarian election) to 34, resulting in a strong variation of the proportionality of the electoral system. Similarly, the cantonal party systems vary in terms of fragmentation and polarization. Parties do not necessarily compete in all electoral districts. This research design offers thus important advantages for comparative analyses. A possible drawback is that the voting decision process may also be influenced by party strategies at the national level. This may dilute the observed effects of district-specific characteristics and mean that the design leads to a more conservative test of contextual effects.

At the individual level, my dependent variable is a measure of voters' propensity to support a given party. Using such 'voting propensities' or 'electoral utilities', rather than voting choice, is quite frequent in the framework of spatial models. The analysis focuses on the evaluation of the choice alternatives, rather than on voting choice. This corresponds to a two-stage model of the voting decision process (van der Eijk et al. 2006; van der Eijk and Marsh 2007; Rosema 2006). The first stage represents the evaluations of parties, which can be measured with voting propensities. The second stage is the translation of these evaluations into a voting

[2] The dataset is available from Sidos, the Swiss data archive for the social sciences, at http://nesstar.sidos.ch.

choice – where citizens decide to support the party for which their expected utility is highest. In the 2007 Swiss election study, voting propensities were measured for eight parties, asking citizens to indicate how likely it is that they will ever vote for each of the corresponding parties. Answers were coded on an 11–point scale, ranging from a 'very low probability' to a 'very high probability'. This variable is recoded to the 0–1 range (descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in the appendix). The analysis will however be limited to the four governmental parties: the Social-Democrats (SP), the Christian-Democrats (CVP), the Liberals (FDP), and the right-wing populist Swiss People's Party (SVP). This limitation is due to the leader evaluations, that were measured only for the four major parties.

The model to be estimated has a hierarchical structure. Voting propensities are influenced by ideological distances between voters and parties, and by voters' evaluations of parties' leaders. The strength of these relationships is conditional on both individual and contextual variables. I estimate this model by following a two-step strategy (Achen 2005; Jusko and Shively 2005; Lewis and Linzer 2005): First, I estimate the individual-level model separately in each canton, with OLS regressions.[3] Then, I use the coefficients from the first-stage models as the dependent variables and regress them on the context-level characteristics. While the number of observations for this second-stage model is relatively small, the results presented below reveal that it is sufficient to obtain significant effects. I estimate the second-stage model using weighted least squares regressions, which allow accounting for the differences across contexts in the standard deviations of the stage-one coefficients. The weights are computed following the method proposed by Lewis and Linzer (2005: 351f.).[4]

This individual-level model can be written formally as follows:

$$U_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \left| v_i - p_j \right| + \beta_2 l_{ij} + \beta_3 s_i + \beta_4 s_i \left| v_i - p_j \right| + \beta_5 s_i l_{ij} + \sum_k \beta_k x_k + \varepsilon \qquad [1]$$

where U_{ij} is the voting propensity of voter *i* for party *j*, v_i and p_j are the positions of voter *i* and party *j*, respectively, on the left–right scale, l_{ij} is the sympathy of voter *i* for the leader of party *j*, s_i is the degree of political sophistication of voter *i*, and the x_k are control variables.

The dependent variable being a scale, I will estimate the model of Equation 1 with OLS regressions. The structure of the dataset is 'stacked', meaning that there are several observations for each respondent. The observations correspond to voter × party relationships, rather than to individuals. This implies a multiplication of the number of observations. It also

[3] Only 25 of the 26 cantons can be analyzed. There was no election in the canton of Nidwalden, as only one party presented a candidate (a so-called 'tacit' election).

[4] The procedure recommended by Lewis and Linzer can be estimated using the *edvreg* program for Stata, available at http://svn.cluelessresearch.com/twostep/trunk/edvreg.ado.

means that the number of available observations may vary across respondents, due to missing values. In order to reflect the true number of persons interviewed, the observations for each respondent were weighted by the inverse of the number of available voter × party relationships for that person. The stacking procedure also implies that the observations corresponding to a given respondent may not be independent from one another. To avoid a possible bias, I have computed clustered standard errors.

The ideological positions of voters and parties are measured on an 11–point left–right scale. Voters were asked for their own position on this scale, as well as for their perceptions of the major parties' positions. The positions of parties are defined as the *average* voter perceptions, and the distances as the *absolute* distances between voters and parties.

Evaluations of leaders were measured with questions on the degree of sympathy, on 11–point scales. Respondents were asked to evaluate in this way four politicians, one from each of the four governmental parties. Each of them was then a member of the federal government (Federal Council): Micheline Calmy-Rey (SP, Foreign affairs), Doris Leuthard (CVP, Economic affairs), Pascal Couchepin (FDP, Home affairs), Christoph Blocher (SVP, Justice and Police). These evaluations were coded similarly to distances. A high degree of sympathy for the leader of a given party corresponds thus to a *small* value of the leader evaluation variable, that is, to a small 'distance' to that party. Low levels of sympathy, by contrast, translates into large values of the corresponding leader evaluation variable.

Political sophistication is an index of political knowledge, based on five questions. Respondents were invited to mention the name of the president of the Federal Council, the number of political parties represented in this Council, the number of signatures required to launch a popular initiative at the federal level, the number of their canton's representative in the National Council (the lower house of the federal parliament), and the name of the party with the largest share of seats in the National Council. All answers were simply coded as either right or wrong and added, leading to a 6–point scale. For the analyses presented below, the political sophistication scale, as well as the ideological distances and leader evaluations, were first recoded to the 0–1 range, and then centred.

In addition to these central causal variables, the models tested here include a few additional variables. First, I include party specific constants, that allow capturing variation across parties in the average voting propensities, which is independent of ideological distances and leader evaluations. Second, I control for voters' party identification.

At the contextual level, I consider three variables: polarization, fragmentation, and proportionality. The degree of polarization of the party system can be defined as the standard deviation of the distribution of parties' ideological positions, weighting for party sizes (Taylor and Herman 1971). This index requires information on party positions and on party strength (to compute the *weighted* average party position). As far as party strength is concerned, I rely on the vote shares at the 2007 election. Party positions in a given canton are measured as the *average* perceived positions on the left–right scale.[5]

The measure of party system fragmentation is quite straightforward: It is computed as the effective number of parties, based on vote shares in the 2007 election (Laakso and Taagepera 1979). The proportionality of an electoral system, finally, depends on both the electoral rule and the district magnitude. In the case of Swiss national elections, cantons only vary with respect to the district magnitude. I measure the degree of proportionality using Lijphart's (1997) electoral threshold index, defined as 75%/(M+1), where M is the district magnitude. As the distribution of this variable is strongly skewed, I transform it by taking its natural logarithm.

These three aspects of the electoral context are likely to be related to one another. A fragmented party system is more likely to be encountered in less proportional elections, i.e., in cantons with a small number of seats. I would also expect these party systems to be less polarized than those of larger cantons. This could be a problem for the analysis if the relationships among these three aspects of competitiveness are too strong. This would make it difficult to separate their respective effects. With the data analyzed, there is a relatively strong correlation of –0.69 between fragmentation and the measure of proportionality. Given the limited number of observations at the contextual level, this may be problematic. The first analyses I have performed have revealed a problem of multicollinearity when both of these variables were included in the model. As a consequence, the analyses reported here are based on models including only either fragmentation or proportionality.

[5] Measuring cantonal party positions with data from the Comparative Candidate Survey (CCS) would be an alternative. This would avoid the problem that perceptions of party positions could themselves be affected by the degree of polarization (Lachat 2008). However, CCS data is linked with other problems. As not all candidates have responded to the survey, data for some parties are entirely missing in small cantons, which strongly biases the measured level of polarization.

Results

I start the analysis by estimating the model of Equation 1 at the national level. This gives a first impression of the impact of individual-level variables, and will serve as a reference when considering the combined effect of individual and contextual characteristics. The results presented in Table 1 show that both left–right distances and leader evaluations impact on voting propensities. Without much surprise, the probability to support a given party increases with the ideological proximity to this party and with the sympathy for its leader. More interesting, the results also show that the strength of these relationships is conditional on voters' degree of political sophistication. Both effects are stronger among political 'experts' than among political 'novices'. But the difference is particularly strong with respect to ideological voting. These interaction effects of political sophistication are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, by comparing voters with 'high' and 'low' levels of political sophistication (i.e., with an average degree of sophistication plus or minus one standard deviation[6]).

[Table 1 about here]

As far as ideological voting is concerned (Figure 1), the results fit largely with the theoretical expectations. All voters respond to ideological distances, but this effect is stronger among political experts. The case of leader voting is more surprising (Figure 2). These evaluations affect voting propensities as strongly as ideological distances do and the strength of this relationship increases a little bit with one's level of political sophistication. 'Leader voting' is slightly stronger among political experts than among political novices. In relative terms, however, the importance of 'leader voting' decreases with the level of political sophistication.

[Figures 1 and 2 about here]

In a next step, I analyze how the effects of ideology and of leader evaluations are influenced by the competitiveness of the cantonal electoral context. This involves a hierarchical data structure, where the individual-level relationships between ideology, leader evaluations, and voting propensities, are affected by context-level factors. I first do this with a restricted version of the context-level model, that includes only the polarization index. Having a single

[6] As far as the other variables are concerned, the expected values are computed for the Social Democrats, for a respondent without a party identification and with average values for the leader sympathy (Figure 1) or the ideological distance (Figure 2).

independent variable at the context-level makes it possible to present the results in graphical form. Figure 3 shows how the impact of ideological proximity varies with the level of polarization. The figure is divided into two panels, corresponding to respondents with a low and high level of political sophistication, respectively (defined as above – the other individual-level variables are also set at the same values than for Figures 1 and 2). In each of these two panels, the effect of ideological proximity on the voting propensity is plotted against the degree of polarization of the party system. Two types of results are presented in each panel: the estimated effect of ideology in each canton (i.e., the regression coefficients estimated in the first stage models, represented here by dots), and the regression line estimated at the second stage, as well as the associated confidence interval.

[Figure 3 about here]

Looking first at the left-hand panel of Figure 3, i.e., the results estimated for voters with a low degree of political expertise, we notice that the effect of ideology is negative in almost all cantons. A larger ideological distance leads to a smaller voting propensity, in line with the results of the model estimated at the national level (Table 1). We also see that this effect becomes stronger (i.e., more negative) as polarization increases. The impact of ideology is more pronounced in polarized party systems than in less polarized electoral contexts. While this effect may seem strong in the figure, it is only significant at the 90 per cent level (β=–3.48, p-value=0.091). Given the relatively small number of observations, however, this can be considered to be acceptable. Comparing the two panels of Figure 3, we can further consider how these relationships vary with voters' level of political sophistication. Among political experts, the effect of ideology is stronger than among political novices. It does not vary more strongly with the degree of polarization, but this relation is more clearly significant (β=–3.43, p-value=0.009).

The corresponding results for leader evaluations are presented in Figure 4. The figure is structured in exactly the same way. The contrast between Figure 3 and Figure 4 is striking: the effects of both polarization and political sophistication are much smaller here. Evaluations of leaders have a strong impact on the voting propensities. The average estimated coefficient is –0.43 among political novices, clearly stronger than the corresponding effect of ideology (–0.27). Among political experts, the average estimated effect is –0.50, about equal to the effect of ideology (–0.45). While leader evaluations are thus an important determinant of voting propensities, their effect is only weakly influenced by sophistication or party system

polarization (the effect of polarization never reaches statistical significance, even with very generous confidence intervals).

[Figure 4 about here]

The impact of leader evaluations seems thus not to be affected by party system polarization. And it is only weakly conditioned by voters' degree of political expertise – similarly to what was found at the national level. Before reaching any definitive conclusion, however, I turn to more inclusive context-level models, combining several measures of election competitiveness. I summarize the corresponding results in Table 2. It presents results from three models, including different sets of independent variables. Each of these models is estimated for both ideological voting and leader voting. Model 1 is identical with the model presented in Figures 3 and 4. It is simply presented here again in table form, to facilitate comparisons with the further models. Model 2 explains the strength of ideological or leader voting with the polarization and fragmentation of the party system, while model 3 combines polarization with the proportionality of the electoral system.

[Table 2 about here]

These additional models show a different picture than the results of model 1. Ideological voting and leader voting are both responsive to the degree of competitiveness of the electoral context, but to different aspects. The strength of ideological voting varies mainly with the level of polarization and with the degree of fragmentation. This picture is complicated by the fact that these effects are not uniform across groups of voters with different levels of political sophistication: the effect of polarization is only significant among respondents with an average or high degree of political knowledge, while the impact of fragmentation is not significant among political experts. The values of the coefficients may give the impression that the effect of polarization is much stronger than that of fragmentation. This impression is misleading, however, as the range of values taken by these variables differ strongly from one another (cf. Table A2). In substantial terms, the effect of fragmentation is stronger than those of polarization and proportionality.[7]

[7] In the case of model 2 and among voters with an average level of political sophistication, for instance, the effect of a one standard deviation increase in the level of polarization reduces the coefficient of ideological voting by –0.053, while a corresponding change in the degree of fragmentation has a larger effect of –0.060. The corresponding effects in model 3 for polarization and proportionality are –0.046 and –0.044, respectively.

As far as the impact of leader evaluations is concerned, party system polarization plays almost no role at all. This variable has a significant impact in a single instance. The fragmentation of the party system and the proportionality of the electoral system, by contrast, influence the strength of leader voting – at least among voters with a low or average degree of political expertise. Among these groups of voters, the impact of leader evaluations becomes significantly *smaller* as the fragmentation of the party system increases and as the electoral system becomes more proportional (i.e., as the effective threshold becomes smaller). In other words, 'leader voting' is less pronounced in competitive elections, as expected, but it responds only to some of the aspects of context's electoral competitiveness.

Conclusion

The starting point for this paper was the hypothesis of a trade-off between ideological voting and 'leader voting'. I expected that a stronger level of ideological voting would be associated with weaker leader voting. I also expected to observe such differences both across groups of voters and across electoral contexts. At the individual-level, I argued that political experts should rely more strongly on ideology and less strongly on leader evaluations than political novices. At the context level, I expected a similar difference between more competitive and less competitive electoral contexts. Ideological voting should be stronger, and leader voting weaker, where the party system is polarized and fragmented, and where the electoral system is more proportional.

The results based on the 2007 Swiss national elections have only partially confirmed these hypotheses. The idea of a general trade-off between these two types of determinants of party preferences is not supported by my results. Ideology and leader evaluations are both important to explain voting choices, but they are not conditioned by the same factors. At the individual-level, there is a clear interaction effect between sophistication and ideological voting. Left–right distances between voters and parties are less important among political novices than among experts. Yet, contrary to my expectations, leader voting is also strengthened by an increase in the level of political sophistication – though this effect is weaker than for ideological voting. While this implies that the *relative* impact of the two types of explanatory factors is influenced in the expected way by political sophistication, this is at best only a partial confirmation of the hypothesis. Leader voting turns out to be quite strong among all voters. The political experts do not rely on such evaluations less strongly than the political

novices. As one's level of political sophistication increases, the impact of the heuristic elements in the voting decision process does not decrease.

At the contextual level, I have shown that competitiveness have different effects on ideological voting and on leader voting. However it is also different aspects of competitiveness that matter most for the two types of variables. Ideological voting is stronger in polarized and in fragmented party systems. Leader voting, by contrast, does not depend on the degree of polarization, but it varies with both the fragmentation of the party system and the proportionality of the electoral system. For both of these characteristics, less competitive elections lead to larger effects of leader evaluations.

Appendix

[Tables A1–A2 about here]

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Table 1. Impact of left–right ideology and leader evaluations on the electoral utilities, national level

	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.
Left–right distance	–0.419***	0.015
Leader evaluation	–0.450***	0.011
Political sophistication	0.008***	0.002
Left–right distance × sophistication	–0.062***	0.010
Leader evaluation × sophistication	–0.022**	0.007
CVP	–0.058***	0.008
FDP	0.093***	0.008
SVP	0.040***	0.007
(party identification not reported)		
Constant	0.408***	0.006
N (weighted)	4,059	
R^2	0.45	

** p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001*



Figure 1. Propensity to support the SP, by ideological distance and level of political sophistication



Figure 2. Propensity to support the SP, by sympathy for the party leader and level of political sophistication



Figure 3. Effect of left–right distances on the voting propensities, by political sophistication and by party system polarization



Figure 4. Effect of leader evaluations on the probabilities to vote, by political sophistication and by party system polarization

Table 2. Effect of electoral competitiveness on ideological voting and on leader voting

	Effect on ideological voting			Effect on leader voting		
	Low soph.	Average soph.	High soph.	Low soph.	Average soph.	High soph.
Model 1						
Polarization	–3.48†	–3.56**	–3.43**	–0.54	–0.20	–0.07
	(1.97)	(1.26)	(1.19)	(0.88)	(0.43)	(0.64)
Model 2						
Polarization	–1.38	–2.87*	–2.69*	–1.11	–0.58	–0.30
	(1.73)	(1.05)	(1.26)	(0.84)	(0.41)	(0.74)
ENEP	–0.07**	–0.04**	–0.03	0.02*	0.01*	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Model 3						
Polarization	–2.33	–2.48†	–2.27†	–1.37	–0.94*	–0.59
	(2.15)	(1.30)	(1.24)	(0.93)	(0.40)	(0.72)
Log(effective threshold)	0.05	0.05†	0.05*	–0.03†	–0.03**	–0.02
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)

*† p<0.10 ; * p<0.05 ; ** p<0.01 ; *** p<0.001*

Note: entries are regression coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) estimated at the contextual level.

Table A1. Descriptive statistics, individual-level variables

	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Electoral utility	16,696	0.43	0.34	0.00	1.00
Left–right distance (to average perceived party position)	15,921	0.00	0.19	–0.25	0.61
Left–right distance (to individual perception)	14,807	0.00	0.25	–0.29	0.71
Leader evaluation (–1 * Sympathy)	16,051	0.00	0.31	–0.47	0.53
Political sophistication	16,696	0.00	1.46	–2.50	2.50
Party identification					
Party identifier × own party	16,696	0.09	0.28	0.00	1.00
Party identifier × other party	16,696	0.34	0.47	0.00	1.00

Table A2. Descriptive statistics, contextual-level variables

	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Polarization	25	0.037	0.018	0.000	0.071
Fragmentation	25	4.170	1.430	1.290	6.710
Proportionality	25	2.460	0.830	0.760	3.620