

Beyond the traditional economic divide.

Class location and political attitudes in 21 European Countries

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Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between individuals' position in the employment structure and their political preferences. Our analysis diverges from the existing literature with respect to two elements. Firstly, we focus on the concept of class location instead of relying on the more ambitious concept of social class. Secondly, we define political preferences with respect to both issues of the distribution of resources and questions of community and identity. On the basis of individual-level data for 21 countries, we examine six hypotheses of political divides running across the occupational structure. We find strong empirical support for the traditional economic opposition that separates the traditional bourgeoisie from workers. Our analysis also points to antagonisms within both the salaried middle class and the working class. Managers are both more market-liberal and more authoritarian than socio-cultural specialists, while service workers are culturally more liberal than production workers. The salience of class divides varies across countries. We show that these country differences are partly explained by the level of post-industrial employment.

Keywords: social class; cleavage; left-right; authoritarian-libertarian; political attitudes; European Social Survey

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Introduction

Over the last two decades, political scientists and sociologists have become increasingly doubtful as to the role of class in the explanation of political preferences. Scepticism about the political salience of social structure was raised in the 1980s by several studies reporting that class-based voting was regressing in almost all modern democracies (Dalton et al., 1984; Crew and Denver, 1985; Rose and McAllister, 1986; Franklin et al., 1992). Verdicts ranged from a cautious expression of the decline of class politics (Dalton, 1996) to a blunt statement of the death of class voting (Clark and Lipset, 1991). This demise of class politics was considered premature by two different strands of research. Firstly, sociologists working on social mobility and stratification objected vehemently and argued that the link between the working class and parties on the left remained solid in large parts of the Western World (Weakliem, 1991; Evans, 1999, 2000; Goldthorpe, 1999; Hout et al., 1999; Weakliem and Heath, 1999).¹ Secondly, political scientists interested in the micro-logic of political preference formation came to the rescue of the concept of social structure (Kitschelt, 1994; Müller, 1997; Kriesi, 1998). Less interested in class *per se*, these authors maintained that individuals' political preferences cannot be usefully explained without reference to their work and market experience.

This paper develops on this second line of reasoning and examines whether different positions in the social structure go along with differences in political preferences. More particularly, our objective is to empirically test whether individuals' occupational class has an influence on attitudes towards economic redistribution and cultural values. Thereby, our focus is not limited to the sole labour-capital divide. In fact, scholars writing about the decline of class politics by and large refer to the declining share of working class members voting for the left. The reason why this particular configuration of class voting has received so much attention in the literature is because it overlaps with a social cleavage – the division between capital and labour – that has profoundly influenced European party systems and political conflicts over the last 150 years. However, working class support for the left is just one particular configuration of the possible ties between social structure and political attitudes. Accordingly, besides this relationship, we develop and empirically examine five additional hypotheses as to the links between occupational class and political preferences.

¹ It must however be noted that besides these studies showing the persistency of class-voting, other analyses for Germany (Pappi and Mnich, 1992; Schnell and Kohler, 1995), Norway (Rindgal and Hines, 1999) and a set of European countries (Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf, 1999; Nieuwbeerta and Manza, 2002) pointed to a decline of class voting.

For this matter, we modify our research strategy in two domains with respect to earlier studies. Firstly, we resort to a class measure that is more differentiated than the binary device that simply separates the working from the middle class; the objective is to use a schema that makes all the distinctions within the social structure that we believe to be relevant for political preferences. Secondly, following Kitschelt (1994) we allow political preferences to vary with respect both to issues of the just distribution of resources (the economic dimension) and questions of community and identity (the cultural dimension). Our hypotheses about the links between class locations and party preferences will thus be spelled out with regard to both these dimensions.

Our paper is structured as follows. A first section focuses on the ties between class location and political dispositions. We formulate six hypotheses about differences in occupational classes' political preferences that can be examined empirically. A second section presents the data, the operationalization of our variables – notably class location and political preferences – and the model to be tested. The third and fourth sections then show and discuss the findings. Our results allow us to identify groups of countries that present specific patterns of class divides. In particular, oppositions within the salaried middle class and within the working class appear to be mutually exclusive. We show that these country differences are linked to the level of post-industrial employment, that is, the degree of tertiarization, professionalization, and feminization of the labor force. The concluding section suggests some directions for further exploring the cross-country differences in the patterns and strength of class divides.

Hypotheses about the link between occupational class and political preferences

At the basis of our analysis stands the argument that the literature about class politics is overly restrictive in two respects: firstly in its definition of class and secondly in its definition of political preferences.

Concerning the definition of class, John Scott's (1994) distinction between *social class* and *class location* is helpful. While a social class in the Weberian sense is defined as a demographic unit that shares a collective identity and a common organization over time, class location simply refers to an individuals' present market and work situations (Scott, 1994). For the issue of class politics, the distinction between social class and class location is consequential: With the possible exception of farmers, large employers ('industrialists'), small business owners ('the petite bourgeoisie') and the working class in some countries and some time periods, the majority of occupational groups have never been *social classes* in the

Weberian sense of units sharing a collective identity and a common organization over time. Hence, historically, the fact that some occupational groups have become social classes with a shared consciousness and a class organization is clearly an exception and not the rule. Accordingly, our focus here lies on the less ambitious concept of class location or, in different terms, on occupational classes. Notwithstanding whether occupational classes turn into social classes or not, we expect political preferences to systematically vary between different class locations.

Concerning the definition of preferences, classes' political dispositions are often narrowly conceived in economic terms. If classes politically differ from each other, then it is on the exclusive basis of their distributive objectives. More privileged classes are expected to prefer conservative policies that preserve their relative economic advantage over other classes. In contrast, less privileged classes are expected to choose redistributive policies that reduce their material disadvantage with respect to other classes. Although these expectations may well be true, they only grasp part of people's political dispositions. Accordingly, we endorse Kitschelt's (1994: 16-7) argument that an individual's class location – through the organizational experience and work environment – is not only related to his or her political preferences on the distributive dimension between a socialist and capitalist pole, but also to his or her dispositions on the communitarian dimension between a libertarian and authoritarian pole.

How do the two concepts of occupational class and political dispositions relate to each other? If differences in political preferences cannot be reduced to a sole distributive dimension, then differences in class locations are not usefully summed up in exclusively hierarchical distinctions between more or less privileged positions within the economic system. The triple expansion of the service sector, higher education and female employment has led to an increasingly heterogeneous class structure where classes' organizational experience and work environment vary strongly. These differences in the work experience influence people's political preferences. Hence, Kitschelt (1994: 18) argues that where people primarily deal with human individuality in their work environment (as in health care, education, social work, communication or art), communicative involvement is strongest and authority relations diluted. Individuals engaged in these interactive work settings are expected to be more likely to hold a libertarian view of community than individuals primarily occupied in object- or document-related tasks. In a similar vein, Kriesi (1989: 1085) and (Müller, 1999: 143) put forward the work experience to explain differences in preferences between occupational classes. Depending on whether individuals are part of a bureaucratic hierarchy,

employed in a technical work setting or evolving in a interpersonal face-to-face service logic, their primary orientation and loyalties are likely to differ. In order to capture these differences, we will resort to a class schema that aims at grasping both hierarchical differences of material advantage and horizontal differences of work logic. We formulate the following six hypotheses as to the different links between occupational classes and political preferences in Europe.

(i) An economic divide between holders of capital and low-skilled workers (Svallfors, 1999): the traditional capital-labour cleavage separates low-skilled service and production workers who have little economic power and are strongly exposed to labour market risks from employers, self-employed professionals and managers who possess either capital or delegated authority over capital. While low-skilled workers are expected to strongly favour state interventions and redistributive mechanisms in order to safeguard their interests, employers and managers are more likely to prefer market solutions and to oppose redistribution.

Hypothesis 1: Service and production workers differ from the traditional bourgeoisie and managers in their economic preferences. While the latter advocate liberal market solutions, the former show stronger support for redistribution and state intervention in the economy.

(ii) An economic and cultural divide within the salaried middle class (Kriesi, 1989, 1998; Müller, 1999): there is an antagonism within the salaried middle classes between managers who try to run their organizations as efficiently as possible and professionals in social and cultural services who seek to defend their own and their clients' relative autonomy. While the first are strongly market-oriented and favour social compliance, the second are more supportive of redistributive mechanisms and hold a more libertarian view of community.

Hypothesis 2: Professionals in the social and cultural services have economically less market-liberal preferences than managers.

Hypothesis 3: Professionals in the social and cultural services have culturally more libertarian preferences than managers.

(iii) A cultural divide between two blocs of the working class (Kitschelt, 1994): Low skilled production and service workers share similarly (dis-)advantaged working conditions. Hence, while we do not expect them to differ in their economic preferences, we expect to find significant differences in their preferences over communitarian politics. In effect, through their daily involvement in communicative experiences with clients, students, patients,

children and the elderly, we expect service workers to endorse a culturally more libertarian position than production workers, whose mainly object-related work tasks provide less opportunity to engage in communicative exchange and deal with cultural diversity.

Hypothesis 4: Service and production workers differ in their preferences over questions of community. Production workers are expected to hold more authoritarian preferences than service workers.

(iv) A cultural divide between the traditional bourgeoisie and small business owners: Within the group of self-employed and employers, it is essential for electoral sociology to look separately at the *traditional bourgeoisie* (large employers and self-employed professionals) on the one hand and the *petite bourgeoisie* (small business owners such as shop holders, artisans, independents) on the other. Although both units share strong economic preferences for market mechanisms, the traditional bourgeoisie's higher education and more privileged position in society is reflected in more libertarian cultural preferences as compared to those small business owners.

Hypothesis 5: Members of the traditional bourgeoisie differ politically from small business owners in their more libertarian preferences on the cultural dimension.

(v) An economic divide between the traditional bourgeoisie and the salaried middle class: The proprietors of capital – the *traditional bourgeoisie* of large employers and self-employed professionals – differ in their economic preferences from the salaried middle class. The ownership of capital and autonomy from economic authority make the *traditional bourgeoisie* more sympathetic to market solutions than members of the salaried middle class. We expect this to hold true for even the most market-oriented component of the salaried middle class: managers.

Hypothesis 6: Members of the traditional bourgeoisie stand politically apart from the salaried middle class and notably its most market-oriented category – the managers – through their stronger market-liberal preferences.

Data and models

Rather than focusing on a single country, our aim is to test these hypotheses for a large number of different contexts. This should allow us to be more confident in the validity of our hypotheses, should they be supported. Focusing on a single case bears the risk of having results influenced by the particular features of a given context. While considering a larger

number of countries has the potential advantage of leading to more robust findings, it is linked with important constraints for the choice of our data. In order to replicate our analysis in several contexts we need comparable measures of citizens' occupations and political preferences. Furthermore, making the distinctions among occupational classes implied by our hypotheses requires detailed information on citizens' occupations. To this end, we rely on data from the first module of the European Social Survey,² which is one of the few comparative research projects including both a relatively large number of countries and detailed information about occupations and political attitudes.

Since our paper's focus lies on the relationship between occupational classes and political preferences, the conceptualization and operationalization of class carries particular weight. We use a class concept developed and examined in great detail by Oesch (2006). It rests on two criteria. The first *hierarchical* criterion refers to the extent of marketable skills and results from employers' rational action: the more marketable skills are required for competent performance of an occupation, the more important is the incentive system – and the more advantageous the employment relationship – that an employer will set up to get maximal productivity out of his employees (Goldthorpe, 2000: 213). Based on this criterion, two levels of marketable skills are distinguished: (1) higher-grade managerial/professional and lower grade managerial/associate professional; (2) vocationally/generally skilled and low-/unskilled..

The second *horizontal* criterion distinguishes four work logics (Müller, 1999: 143), relating to differences in the organizational experience. Depending on whether an occupation involves the deployment of technical expertise and craft, the administration of organizational power, or face-to-face attendance to people's personal demands, the work logic and primary orientation differ in fundamental ways. Accordingly, on a horizontal axis four work logics are distinguished that give each rise to a separate hierarchy: (1) an *independent work logic* that regroups employers and the self-employed; (2) a *technical work logic* where daily work either consists in the development and use of technical expertise or the deployment of craft and manual skills; (3) an *organizational work logic* defined by bureaucratic imperatives where the work experience is shaped by either coordination and control or clerical tasks; (4) an *interpersonal work logic* where individuals employed in a interpersonal service setting primarily deal with human individuality. From the combination of the two criteria of marketable skills and work logic results the 8-class schema shown in Table 1.³ We allocate

² The data are available from the website of the project (<http://ess.nsd.uib.no/>).

³ For the discussion and analysis of a more detailed 17-class version, see Oesch (2006).

individuals to these classes on the basis of information about (i) their employment status (employee or employer/self-employed), (ii) the number of their employees and, most consequently, (iii) their present occupation (ISCO 1988 codes at the most detailed 4-digit level).⁴

[Table 1 about here]

We measure voters' attitudes towards both the issue of redistribution (the economic dimension) and the questions of community and identity (the cultural dimension). For the first dimension, citizens' preferences are assessed by a question asking to which extent they agree or disagree with the statement that 'the government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels'. Answers were coded on a five-point scale, ranging from 'agree strongly' to 'disagree strongly'. For the purpose of our analyses, this variable was standardized. Higher values indicate less support for redistributive measures. The number of available indicators is larger for the cultural dimension. We rely on seven variables that measure attitudes towards immigration and cultural liberalism. All of these correspond to the authoritarian vs. libertarian dimension defined by Kitschelt (1994) or the GAL-TAN dimension (i.e., 'Green-Alternative-Libertarian' vs. 'Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalism') identified by Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson (2002). We have constructed a summary measure of citizens' attitudes on this dimension with a principal-component factor analysis. The seven indicators are structured by a single dimension (Table 2), which we use as our measure of citizens' cultural preferences. As it is constructed with a factor analysis, this second variable is also standardized. Higher values on this dimension indicate stronger support for an authoritarian or 'TAN' position.

[Table 2 about here]

Finally, our statistical models also include respondents' gender and age as control variables. Gender is a dummy, taking the value 0 for men and the value 1 for women. With respect to age, we distinguish four categories: less than 30 years old, from 30 to 44, from 45 to 59, and 60 or older.

⁴ We only included respondents working full-time (30 hours or more a week). The syntax used to operationalize the schema is available from the authors for both Stata and SPSS.

To test our six hypotheses, we estimate a series of models where respondents' political preferences are regressed on their occupational class, as well as on their gender and age category. Each of these models includes only respondents from two occupational categories, corresponding to the contrast we want to test. The models we estimate are thus all of the following general form:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot \text{Class} + \beta_2 \cdot \text{Gender} + \sum_k \beta_k \cdot \text{Age}_k + \varepsilon \quad (1)$$

where Y is respondents' attitudes on the redistributive or authoritarian-libertarian dimension, Class is a dummy variable corresponding to one of the five contrasts we have identified, and Gender and Age_k are the control variables specified above. All of these models are estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions.

Individual-level results

Table 3 presents our results for all six hypotheses. We indicate here only the coefficients of the class dummies, as well as the corresponding standard errors.⁵ The variables have been coded in such a way that a positive coefficient indicates a difference between occupational classes that fits with our expectations. Hypothesis 1 is strongly supported. In all but two countries, service and production workers are significantly more supportive of redistributive measures than managers and the traditional bourgeoisie. The two exceptions are Italy and Israel, where the difference between these two occupational classes is not significantly different from 0. The traditional economic divide is still salient in most European countries - at least at the level of citizens' attitudes. Furthermore, the differences we observe are quite substantial. In almost half of the cases, the gap in the average economic preferences of the two groups is close to or larger than half a standard deviation.

[Table 3 about here]

The remaining hypotheses are not supported as systematically. The second and third hypotheses focus on the contrast between socio-cultural specialists and managers with respect to both the economic and cultural dimensions. In most countries, the estimated differences in the political attitudes of these two occupational classes are in the expected direction. But they

⁵ The full regression results, including also the estimated coefficients for the control variables, are available from the authors.

do not always reach statistical significance. The differences are more pronounced on the cultural dimension: Managers have significantly more conservative or authoritarian attitudes in about half of the countries (11 out of 21). On the economic dimension, by contrast, the expected pattern of socio-cultural specialists being more supportive of redistributive measures than managers is observed in a third of the countries only. Our hypotheses about a divide within the salaried middle class are thus not supported in all countries. At the same time, it clearly appears that citizens' location in the occupational structure is relevant not only to understand their *economic* preferences, but also their attitudes on *cultural* matters. Furthermore, the two types of attitudes seem to be strongly related to one another as far as this divide is concerned. In all the countries where a significant economic divide can be observed between managers and socio-cultural specialists, these two groups also differ from one another on the cultural dimension.

Our fourth hypothesis relates to the contrast between service and production workers with respect to the questions of community. Contrary to what we expected, there are only six countries where service workers have a more libertarian outlook than production workers. While the average estimated difference is in the expected direction in all but a few countries, the uncertainty surrounding this effect is usually quite large. This is due to the relatively high level of heterogeneity of the political attitudes within each of these groups. While our hypothesis is supported in a few countries only, it is noteworthy that production workers are among the most authoritarian groups in virtually all countries (the average positions of social groups on both dimensions are presented in the appendix, in Tables A1 and A2). Production workers have the most 'TAN' position in just over half of the countries considered here. Furthermore, in most of the other countries, they are ranked second according to this criterion, just behind the petite bourgeoisie.

This conservative position of the petite bourgeoisie has also important implications for our fifth hypothesis. We expect members of the traditional bourgeoisie to be culturally more liberal than the petite bourgeoisie, as a consequence of their higher educational level and more privileged social position, among others. Such a difference can be observed in a majority of the countries considered in this analysis. In twelve countries, large employers and the self-employed professionals have a more libertarian view of community than the members of the petite bourgeoisie. These differences are often quite large, with an average value over all 21 countries close to half a standard deviation (0.48). This is larger than the average difference on the economic scale for the traditional economic divide, opposing workers to managers and the traditional bourgeoisie (average distance of 0.43). The contrast associated with hypothesis

5 is significant in fewer cases than for hypothesis 1 - but this is also due to the smaller number of available observations. Among the non significant differences, many correspond to quite sizeable point estimates, but which were estimated with only about a hundred observations or even less (e.g., France, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom).

Finally, hypothesis 6 focuses on the economic dimension and the expected divide between the traditional bourgeoisie and managers. Our data only offer little support for this expectation. Managers are significantly more supportive of the redistributive role of the State in only five countries. While members of the traditional bourgeoisie form the most market-liberal occupational class in a majority of countries, managers have often similar economic preferences.

Explaining country differences in the class divides

Altogether, our results offer mixed support for the hypotheses we have formulated. We find strong evidence for both the traditional economic divide (hypothesis 1) and the cultural divide between the traditional bourgeoisie and the petite bourgeoisie (hypothesis 5). While the statistical test for the latter hypothesis reveals that the effect of this class contrast is not significant in a substantial minority of countries, we have emphasized that this is partly due to the small size of these two groups of citizens. Besides these two hypotheses, the cultural divide between socio-cultural specialists and managers (hypothesis 3) also receives empirical support in a majority of countries. Hypotheses 2, 4 and 6, by contrast, are confirmed in a few countries only.

If we shift our focus from single hypotheses to the general results for all countries, an interesting pattern emerges. Firstly, as noted above, hypotheses 2 and 3 tend to go together. If one is substantiated in a given country, the other is usually confirmed as well. Furthermore, we also observe that in the countries where these two hypotheses receive empirical support, hypotheses 4 and 6 are *not* validated. This pattern appears very clearly and there are almost no exceptions to it. Out of the 21 countries under study, there are actually only four countries that present a particular configuration: in Hungary, Italy and Luxembourg, none of these four hypotheses is confirmed, while in the Netherlands, hypotheses 3 and 6 are supported (see Table A3 in the annexe for an overview of confirmed hypotheses by country). Table 4 reveals that all other countries fit into one of two categories: those where hypotheses 2 and 3 are confirmed (or only the third hypothesis in a few cases) and those where either hypothesis 4 or hypothesis 6 (or sometimes both of them) is supported.

[Table 4 about here]

This finding strongly suggests that there is no single configuration of class divides that would equally apply to all European countries. Instead, we face at least two distinct sets of oppositions, which seem to be mutually exclusive. Apart from the traditional economic divide (hypothesis 1) and from the cultural contrast between the traditional bourgeoisie and the petite bourgeoisie (hypothesis 5), which are strong in most countries, there are two patterns of divisions between occupational classes. One is characterized by the contrast between two segments of the salaried middle class, the managers and the socio-cultural specialists, on both redistributive issues and the conception of the community. The second pattern combines an economic divide between the traditional bourgeoisie and the managers with a cultural opposition within the working class, between production workers and service workers.

It is difficult to identify a single criterion that would allow us to distinguish clearly between these two groups of countries. However, we notice some regional patterns. The first group, where the divide between the segments of the salaried middle class is salient, includes all Scandinavian and Southern European countries. In the second group, by contrast, we find the Central and Eastern European countries. This distinction is not perfect, however: in each of these groups of country, there is one case where none of these four hypotheses is validated (Italy and Hungary, respectively). Furthermore, the remaining countries do not seem to follow a clear pattern. The Anglo-Saxon countries are split between the two groups, as are the German-speaking countries. At this stage, we can only suggest some likely explanations, which would require more detailed analysis to be tested properly.

One factor that we believe to be crucial for the opposition within the salaried middle class is the degree of post-industrial change that the occupational structure has undergone. Under post-industrial change, we understand the triple expansion of the service sector, higher education and female employment. The more strongly tertiarized, professionalized and feminized a country's labour force is, the more strongly formed are the identities and the more distinct the attitudes of managers and socio-cultural specialists respectively. Hence, among the possible relevant contextual characteristics explaining the configuration of Table 4 is the level of post-industrialization of the employment structure: Countries with a larger post-industrial employment share should be more likely to have a economic and cultural divide between managers and socio-cultural professionals. We perform an exploratory test of this hypothesis by designing an 'index of post-industrial employment', which combines information on the size of the service sector, the share of professionals and associate

professionals as well as the share of women in the workforce (the construction of this index is documented in Table A4 the appendix).

To analyze the relationship between the level of post-industrial employment and the strength of the class divides, we have estimated regression models at the country level. For each of the six hypotheses, we regress the coefficient of the class dummy from the model of equation (1) on the index of post-industrial employment. As the uncertainty characterizing the estimated values of the dependent variable varies across countries, the data is heteroskedastic and such a model cannot be estimated with a standard OLS regression (Achen, 2005; Lewis and Linzer, 2005). We rely instead on Weighted Least Squares regression (WLS), following the weighting procedure recommended by Lewis and Linzer (2005: 350-352). The estimation results are presented in Table 5.⁶

[Table 5 about here]

Since this estimation is performed at the country-level, we have much fewer observations. Accordingly, we obtain large standard errors. Despite this, we observe that the level of post-industrial employment has – as expected – a significant impact on the economic divide between managers and socio-cultural specialist. Moreover, it is close to being significant at the 10 percent level for the hypothesis of a cultural divide between the same two categories. Given the small number of observations, this suggests that the level of post-industrial employment matters for the opposition between managers and socio-cultural specialists. Surprisingly, we also find that in countries with a larger share of post-industrial employment the traditional economic divide (between the traditional bourgeoisie and workers) tends to be larger. This finding is mainly driven by the Mediterranean countries which have both a lower than average share of post-industrial employment and a lower than average opposition between the traditional bourgeoisie and workers in attitudes on redistributive issues.

Conclusion

This paper has examined the relationship between individuals' position in the employment structure and their political preferences. In our analysis, we have diverged from the existing literature with respect to two elements. Firstly, we have focused on the concept of class

⁶ Only the estimated coefficients and standard errors for the effect of the level of post-industrial employment are presented here. The full regression results are available from the authors.

location (that is, occupational class) instead of relying on the more ambitious concept of social class. This means that notwithstanding whether occupational classes turn into social classes or not – that is whether they share a collective identity and a common organization over time – we expect their political attitudes to systematically vary. Accordingly, we have resorted to a detailed class schema that allows us to differentiate between both hierarchical and horizontal differences in individuals' class locations. Secondly, unlike traditional enquiries into class politics, we have defined political preferences with respect both to issues of the distribution of resources (the economic dimension) and questions of community and identity (the cultural dimension). Classes may not only differ as to their attitudes on economic issues, but also on cultural questions

Based on these premises, we have tested six hypotheses of political divides running across the occupational structure. We find strongest empirical support for the traditional economic opposition that separates the market-liberal traditional bourgeoisie from workers who are more favourable of government intervention into the economy. With the exception of Israel and Italy, this divide seems salient in all the 21 countries. Likewise, the cultural divide setting the traditional bourgeoisie (large business owners and liberal professionals) apart from the more authoritarian petite bourgeoisie (small business owners) also appears significant in a small majority of the countries under study. Concerning an antagonism between managers and socio-cultural specialists, findings are less clear-cut. While the estimated differences in both cultural and economic preferences of these two classes are in the expected direction, they are only significant in about half of all countries. While the divide is stronger on the cultural dimension, it tends to go together – in the single countries – with an economic divide. Hence, managers are both more market-liberal and more authoritarian than socio-cultural specialists in the two german-speaking Republics of the Alps Austria and Switzerland as well as the three Scandinavian countries included in our study, Denmark, Finland and Sweden. Finally, empirical evidence is weakest for the two remaining hypotheses: Only in six countries, production workers are significantly more authoritarian than service workers. Likewise, the economic contrast between the traditional bourgeoisie and managers is only salient in a minority of five countries.

Our findings suggest that occupational class contributes to the understanding of individuals' political preferences both for economic matters of resources and cultural issues of community and identity. However, further research is needed with respect to two questions that remain largely unsettled. A first line to be followed concerns the cross-country pattern of class divides that emerges from our analysis. While we emphasized that there is no single

configuration of class contrasts that would equally apply to all European countries, we are at pains to point out the contextual factors that explain the differences found. Our contribution is limited to the finding that the existence of a cultural and economic divide within the salaried middle class is affected by a country's post-industrial employment share.

A second line to be followed concerns the integration of the political supply side into the analysis. There is wide agreement in the literature that a structural basis and shared preferences alone are not sufficient to render a class divide politically salient (Bartolini and Mair, 1990). In order to become politically salient, occupational classes' common preferences further need to be articulated by a collective actor such as a political party. Hence, whether political divides materialize in the political arena depends on a country's party system. This implies that the class contrasts highlighted in our study will only show in those countries where they are exploited by one or several parties. Hence, more detailed analyses also taking in account the supply side of the political system are needed to improve our understanding of cleavage politics.

Appendix

[Tables A1-A3 about here]

Index of post-industrial employment structure

The index of post-industrial employment combines data on countries' (1) employment share in the service sector, (2) employment share in managerial, professional and associate professional occupations, and (3) share of women aged 15 years and more working in gainful employment. For each of these three indicators, we have calculated the mean value across the 21 countries and then expressed each country's figure as a proportion of this mean value. The index is then the average of these three values.⁷ The values for each of the three indicators and for the resulting index are presented in Table A3.

[Table A4 about here]

⁷ In countries where we have no data for one of the three indicators, the index is computed as the average value of the two available indicators.

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Table 1: Occupational classes based on differences in marketable skills and the work logic

	Independent work logic	Technical work logic	Organizational work logic	Interpersonal work logic
Professional and semi-professional	Large employers and self-employed professionals	Technical specialists	Managers	Socio-cultural Specialists
Skilled and semi-/unskilled	Petite bourgeoisie with and without employees	Production workers	Office clerks	Service workers

Table 2: Structure of citizens' preferences towards cultural issues

	Factor loading
Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish ¹	0.43
To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people? ²	0.73
People who have come to live here should be given the same rights as everyone else ¹	0.48
If a country wants to reduce tensions it should stop immigration ¹	-0.76
[Country] has more than its fair share of people applying refugee status ¹	-0.62
Would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? ³	-0.72
It is better for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs and traditions ¹	-0.65
Eigenvalue	2.85
<i>N</i>	33,391

1 Answers coded on a 5-point scale, ranging from 'agree strongly' to 'disagree strongly'.

2 Answers coded on a 4-point scale, ranging from 'allow many to come and live here' to 'allow none'.

3 Answers coded on an 11-point scale, ranging from 'cultural life undermined' to 'cultural life enriched'.

Table 3: Impact of occupational class membership on respondents' political attitudes

	Hypothesis 1 (workers vs. managers and traditional bourgeoisie, economic dimension)			Hypothesis 2 (managers vs. socio-cultural specialists, economic dimension)			Hypothesis 3 (managers vs. socio-cultural specialists, cultural dimension)		
	Coef.	Std. err.	N	Coef.	Std. err.	N	Coef.	Std. err.	N
	Austria	0.39***	0.11	413	0.45**	0.15	240	0.49***	0.15
Belgium	0.44***	0.11	389	0.12	0.18	162	0.10	0.17	146
Switzerland	0.47***	0.09	494	0.47***	0.12	287	0.33**	0.12	264
Czech Republic	0.95***	0.15	359	0.01	0.25	121	0.10	0.19	105
Germany	0.37***	0.09	647	0.15	0.13	272	0.09	0.12	233
Denmark	0.56***	0.11	457	0.65***	0.15	265	0.39**	0.13	243
Spain	0.23**	0.09	394	0.27*	0.13	149	0.42*	0.17	109
Finland	0.65***	0.09	574	0.32*	0.13	272	0.40***	0.12	264
France	0.38**	0.12	335	0.25	0.18	122	0.58**	0.22	111
United Kingdom	0.51***	0.09	492	0.09	0.14	281	0.46***	0.13	271
Greece	0.18*	0.08	392	0.31*	0.15	112	0.32 [†]	0.18	92
Hungary	0.33***	0.10	437	0.08	0.15	139	-0.07	0.15	104
Ireland	0.35***	0.09	468	0.18	0.16	210	0.02	0.15	188
Israel	0.13	0.09	443	0.00	0.11	272	-0.16	0.12	243
Italy	0.23	0.14	198	0.14	0.19	76	-0.74**	0.26	52
Luxembourg	0.72***	0.13	323	0.15	0.24	145	0.26	0.18	105
Netherlands	0.29**	0.09	509	0.06	0.12	375	0.17 [†]	0.10	356
Poland	0.53***	0.09	482	0.21	0.19	202	-0.14	0.15	157
Portugal	0.22**	0.08	397	-0.04	0.14	96	0.49*	0.22	74
Sweden	0.66***	0.07	626	0.43***	0.09	379	0.31***	0.09	345
Slovenia	0.49***	0.09	405	0.12	0.18	180	0.01	0.17	160

[†] $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

(Continued on next page)

Table 3 (Continued)

	Hypothesis 4 (production workers vs. service workers, cultural dimension)			Hypothesis 5 (traditional bourgeoisie vs. petite bourgeoisie, cultural dimension)			Hypothesis 6 (traditional bourgeoisie vs. managers, economic dimension)		
	Coef.	Std. err.	N	Coef.	Std. err.	N	Coef.	Std. err.	N
Austria	0.30	0.18	182	0.88**	0.30	82	-0.35	0.26	149
Belgium	0.39**	0.14	231	1.02***	0.26	81	0.00	0.24	131
Switzerland	0.01	0.16	221	0.35*	0.16	130	-0.15	0.18	228
Czech Republic	0.30 [†]	0.16	201	0.17	0.25	58	0.92**	0.35	84
Germany	0.37**	0.13	394	0.71***	0.16	131	0.40*	0.18	203
Denmark	0.02	0.14	269	0.02	0.22	68	0.04	0.26	147
Spain	-0.01	0.15	201	0.34	0.27	67	0.16	0.20	105
Finland	0.01	0.13	402	0.64*	0.27	118	0.10	0.29	160
France	0.15	0.17	226	0.54	0.36	64	0.34	0.30	91
United Kingdom	0.16	0.13	269	0.35	0.23	107	0.18	0.21	210
Greece	-0.16	0.13	237	0.30*	0.15	270	0.09	0.17	100
Hungary	0.03	0.14	230	0.74*	0.35	62	0.02	0.29	97
Ireland	0.39**	0.13	248	0.42*	0.17	147	-0.01	0.21	175
Israel	0.00	0.15	216	0.65***	0.18	112	0.28 [†]	0.16	197
Italy	0.27	0.23	96	-0.10	0.25	99	0.08	0.28	53
Luxembourg	0.19	0.20	133	0.03	0.44	34	0.14	0.41	120
Netherlands	0.23	0.15	208	0.20	0.34	43	0.56*	0.25	291
Poland	0.36*	0.16	220	0.97***	0.26	127	0.64*	0.29	175
Portugal	-0.06	0.16	172	0.21	0.24	83	0.15	0.18	81
Sweden	0.10	0.12	331	0.56**	0.22	102	0.09	0.18	241
Slovenia	0.28*	0.12	243	1.09 [†]	0.57	30	-0.25	0.47	129

[†] $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Coefficients and standard errors estimated with OLS regressions. Only the coefficients of the class variable are reported in this table. The class dummies are coded so that positive coefficients correspond to a difference in line with the hypothesis.

Table 4: Classification of countries by the type of dominant class divide

Hypotheses 2 and 3 confirmed and hypotheses 4 and 6 not confirmed	Hypotheses 4 and 6 confirmed and hypotheses 2 and 3 not confirmed
Austria, Switzerland, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France ¹ , United Kingdom ¹ , Greece, Portugal ¹ , Sweden	Belgium ² , Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland ² , Israel ³ , Poland, Slovenia ²

1 Only hypothesis 3 is supported.

2 Only hypothesis 4 is supported.

3 Only hypothesis 6 is supported.

Note: none of these four hypotheses is supported in Hungary, Italy, and Luxembourg. In the Netherlands, hypotheses 3 and 6 are supported.

Table 5: Effect of the level of post-industrial employment on the strength of the class divides

	Coefficient	Standard error	p value	N
Hypothesis 1	0.59	0.35	0.106	21
Hypothesis 2	0.70	0.32	0.043	21
Hypothesis 3	0.83	0.50	0.112	21
Hypothesis 4	0.11	0.33	0.744	21
Hypothesis 5	0.08	0.57	0.894	21
Hypothesis 6	-0.28	0.46	0.554	21

Note: coefficients estimated with WLS regression. The dependent variables are the regression coefficients from the country models presented in Table 3.

Table A1: Average position of social classes on the economic dimension

	Traditional bourgeoisie	Petite bourgeoisie	Technical specialists	Production workers	Managers and administrators	Clerks	Socio-cultural specialists	Service workers
Austria	-0.08	0.03	0.46	-0.06	0.35	0.04	-0.11	-0.20
Belgium	0.45	0.51	0.44	-0.07	0.35	0.07	0.18	0.00
Switzerland	0.49	0.31	0.56	0.12	0.63	0.10	0.14	0.11
Czech Republic	1.94	1.13	0.84	0.26	1.02	0.71	0.86	0.38
Germany	1.02	0.91	0.63	0.31	0.55	0.47	0.38	0.35
Denmark	1.31	1.21	0.82	0.73	1.26	0.77	0.62	0.62
Spain	0.04	0.06	0.10	-0.27	-0.07	-0.11	-0.34	-0.30
Finland	0.36	-0.12	0.16	-0.28	0.23	-0.33	-0.17	-0.45
France	0.34	0.00	0.01	-0.35	-0.18	-0.44	-0.42	-0.58
United Kingdom	0.82	0.60	0.66	0.18	0.60	0.14	0.32	-0.04
Greece	-0.26	-0.58	0.07	-0.49	-0.32	-0.53	-0.62	-0.42
Hungary	-0.05	-0.17	-0.01	-0.51	-0.17	-0.36	-0.28	-0.34
Ireland	0.35	0.03	0.18	-0.05	0.27	-0.09	0.02	-0.01
Israel	-0.02	-0.30	-0.11	-0.42	-0.34	-0.49	-0.40	-0.29
Italy	-0.07	-0.11	0.03	-0.38	-0.13	-0.24	-0.24	-0.33
Luxembourg	0.68	0.53	0.23	-0.19	0.59	0.25	0.34	-0.12
Netherlands	1.11	0.38	0.73	0.38	0.56	0.21	0.43	0.22
Poland	0.89	-0.17	0.13	-0.19	0.25	0.02	-0.15	-0.18
Portugal	-0.10	-0.28	-0.23	-0.53	-0.40	-0.47	-0.43	-0.50
Sweden	0.62	0.38	0.44	0.02	0.54	-0.08	0.01	-0.21
Slovenia	0.00	-0.23	-0.18	-0.51	0.07	-0.58	-0.19	-0.24

Note: Higher values indicate less support for the reduction of differences in income levels by the government.

Table A2: Average position of social classes on the cultural dimension

	Traditional bourgeoisie	Petite bourgeoisie	Technical specialists	Production workers	Managers and administrators	Clerks	Socio-cultural specialists	Service workers
Austria	-1.03	-0.07	-0.33	0.33	-0.12	0.12	-0.62	0.16
Belgium	-0.58	0.34	-0.17	0.30	-0.49	-0.09	-0.58	-0.04
Switzerland	-0.55	-0.17	-0.55	-0.10	-0.48	-0.29	-0.82	-0.18
Czech Republic	-0.19	0.06	0.25	0.53	-0.01	0.00	-0.08	0.31
Germany	-0.54	0.08	-0.33	0.14	-0.42	-0.16	-0.50	-0.19
Denmark	-0.17	-0.13	-0.54	0.03	-0.40	-0.36	-0.78	-0.11
Spain	-0.50	-0.11	-0.40	-0.16	-0.33	-0.27	-0.71	-0.25
Finland	-0.77	-0.09	-0.55	-0.05	-0.61	-0.36	-1.02	-0.35
France	-0.55	-0.10	-0.51	0.21	-0.27	-0.24	-0.83	0.21
United Kingdom	-0.28	0.12	-0.19	0.39	-0.19	0.20	-0.62	0.27
Greece	0.60	0.94	0.55	0.75	0.64	0.75	0.27	0.83
Hungary	-0.11	0.62	0.17	0.66	0.23	0.76	0.33	0.76
Ireland	-0.41	0.01	-0.47	0.11	-0.51	-0.29	-0.47	-0.24
Israel	-0.34	0.31	-0.47	0.23	-0.34	-0.12	-0.26	0.07
Italy	-0.07	0.00	0.08	0.36	-1.11	-0.07	-0.09	0.08
Luxembourg	-0.02	0.03	-0.48	-0.02	-0.45	-0.18	-0.60	-0.12
Netherlands	0.06	0.14	-0.45	-0.01	-0.47	-0.13	-0.63	-0.04
Poland	-0.56	0.24	-0.40	0.21	-0.35	-0.20	-0.31	0.05
Portugal	0.05	0.22	-0.16	0.29	-0.21	0.14	-0.54	0.38
Sweden	-0.97	-0.33	-0.80	-0.38	-0.94	-0.86	-1.30	-0.60
Slovenia	-0.58	0.40	0.05	0.53	0.02	0.21	-0.05	0.23

Note: Higher values indicate more authoritarian or 'TAN' positions.

Table A3: Hypotheses confirmed by group of country

	Hyp. 1	Hyp. 2	Hyp. 3	Hyp. 4	Hyp. 5	Hyp. 6
<i>Anglo-Saxon</i>						
Ireland	x			x	x	
United Kingdom	x		x			
<i>Scandinavian</i>						
Denmark	x	x	x			
Finland	x	x	x		x	
Sweden	x	x	x		x	
<i>Continental</i>						
Austria	x	x	x		x	
Belgium	x			x	x	
Germany	x			x	x	x
France	x		x			
Luxembourg	x					
Netherlands	x		x			x
Switzerland	x	x	x		x	
<i>Mediterranean</i>						
Greece	x	x	x		x	
Italy						
Portugal	x		x			
Spain	x	x	x			
<i>Central and Eastern European</i>						
Czech Republic	x			x		x
Hungary	x				x	
Poland	x			x	x	x
Slovenia	x			x	x	
<i>Others</i>						
Israel					x	x

Table A4: Index of post-industrial employment

	Employment share in service sector (2002)	Employment share in management and professions (2002)	Share of women gainfully employed (2002)	Index of post-industrial employment
Austria	65	32	50	0.95
Belgium	73	42		1.13
Switzerland	73	43	59	1.16
Czech Republic	56	36		0.92
Germany	66	41	49	1.03
Denmark	73	43	73	1.25
Spain	64	30		0.89
Finland	69	42		1.10
France	71		49	1.02
United Kingdom	75	40		1.11
Greece	61	29	38	0.83
Hungary	61	34	47	0.93
Ireland	66	40	49	1.02
Israel	70	35	48	1.00
Italy	63	31	37	0.85
Luxembourg	77		42	1.00
Netherlands	77		56	1.14
Poland	53	31	48	0.87
Portugal	55	26	55	0.88
Sweden	75	43		1.16
Slovenia	54	35	50	0.92
Average	66.5	36.3	50.1	1.01

Note: The data come from the ILO yearly statistics (<http://laborsta.ilo.org>). The employment share in the service sector is based on the International Standard Industrial Classification of all Economic Activities (ISIC-Rev.3). The service sector includes the categories G to P of this classification (see <http://laborsta.ilo.org/applv8/data/isic3e.html> for a definition of the categories) and the share is based on the total number of active citizens, without the categories Q ('extra-territorial organizations and bodies') and X ('not classifiable by economic activity'). The employment share in management and professions is based on the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88). The share corresponds to the number of active citizens classified in the groups 1 ('Legislators, senior officials and managers') and 2 ('Professionals'), in relation to the total number of citizens in classifiable occupations. Data for Luxembourg come from the central statistical office of Luxembourg (<http://www.statec.public.lu>).